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ENJOINING THE CLOUD:
EQUITY, IRREPARABILITY, AND REMEDIES
HANNIBAL TRAVIS*
ABSTRACT
This article examines the tailoring of remedies in cases involving on-
line infringement in particular. When websites communicate copyrighted
works to members of the public, or use trademarks unlawfully, domestic
requirements of equitable relief come into tension with global enforce-
ment cultures. Courts are sometimes persuaded to enjoin entire websites
or to order the defendant and its cloud service providers to end any use of
the copyrights or trademarks at issue, while other courts limit their injunc-
tions to the adjudicated conduct and the parties before them. The ques-
tion sometimes arises whether a site-killing or device-killing order should
issue in light of the defendant’s infringement and third parties’ facilitation
of it, or whether the defendant should simply be ordered to desist from
the infringing acts (and related parties from facilitating those specific
acts).  An increasingly prominent alternative is to withhold an injunctive
remedy in view of the potential recovery of monetary relief.  This article
explores why, despite statutory language, case law precedent, and political
consensus that website blocking should not occur, the sweeping remedy of
site blocking (enjoining any facilitation of site access) continues to be
available.  It argues that site-blocking and orders to third parties not to
index or provide services to a website are in tension with the Supreme
Court’s decision in eBay, the First Amendment demand for narrowly
targeted remedies when publishing and digital communication are at
stake, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s limiting language, remedial
proportionality doctrine, and the failure of the Stop Online Piracy Act of
2011 in Congress.  Remedial inequities are also emerging as between copy-
right and patent or trademark holders, because the bare loss of control of
intellectual property is justifying copyright and trademark injunctions de-
spite patent law cases suggesting that impaired exclusivity and negotiating
leverage are not necessarily “irreparable injury.”
* Professor of Law, Florida International University.  My thanks go to the
Association of American Law Schools Section on Remedies for selecting this paper
after a call for papers for a presentation on a panel on “Intellectual Property
Remedies at the Supreme Court and Worldwide,” which was held at the 2019
Annual Meeting of the association.  In particular, I thank Alexandra Lahav,
Caprice Roberts, John Golden, and the other participants in the 2019 Section on
Remedies panel for their comments.  In addition, I thank Riquan King for his
research assistance, and the FIU College of Law for summer research support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
CLOUD technologies and services deliver storage, computer process-ing power, and communications infrastructure; users with diverse
purposes and in various locations obtain access to them over the Internet.1
Cloud providers confront legal and technical difficulties because users of
various types and sizes may share not only physical storage space but the
same database or database table.2  With the Internet of Things, billions of
connected devices will be everywhere, producing more than $5 trillion in
1. See W. Kuan Hon & Christopher Millard, Cloud Technologies and Services, in
CLOUD COMPUTING LAW (Christopher Millard ed. 2013) (ebook).
2. See id. Cloud services are provided across thousands of data centers con-
taining many thousands or millions of gigabytes of information. See, e.g., In re
Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that Microsoft claims to “man-
age[ ] over one million server computers in [its] datacenters . . . [which] host
more than 200 online services, used by over 1 billion customers and over 20 mil-
lion businesses worldwide”), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (second alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Swarmify, Inc. v. Cloud-
flare, Inc., No. C 17-06957 WHA, 2018 WL 1142204, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018)
(noting that Cloudflare, Inc. is “a San Francisco-based corporation that formed in
2009 and uses a network of data centers to offer reverse-proxy and content delivery
services to other companies”).
2
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economic activity and threatening intellectual property in ways both old
and new.3
Internet service providers (ISPs) find themselves swept up in de-
mands for greater copyright and trademark enforcement online.4  The
evolving law of streaming and other digital “piracy” remedies features in-
novations such as device bans, administrative website blocking, and dy-
namic site blocking injunctions.5  The United States faces the same
pressures that prompted courts and legislatures in Europe and Canada to
consider expanding the scope of intellectual property (IP) remedies.6
Broad injunctions could issue against Internet intermediaries, harming
the protected speech of their users as well as innocent third parties af-
3. See INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE & DIG. ECON. LEADERSHIP TEAM, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FOSTERING THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 3-
4, 33-39 (2017), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iot_green_pa
per_01122017.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9VA-H6Y4].
4. Internet or online service providers are defined for copyright purposes as
“provider[s] of online services or network access, or the operator[s] of facilities
therefor . . . .”  17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2018).  An emerging distinction in Euro-
pean law may be between information society service providers, a similar concept
to Internet service providers, and online content sharing service providers
(OCSPs), a narrower one similar to social media, and potentially more strictly reg-
ulated. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, preamble para. 37 (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14,
2016) https://juliareda.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Copyright_Final_com
promise.pdf [permalink unavailable] (observing that: “Online content sharing ser-
vices providing access to a large amount of copyright protected content uploaded
by their users have become main sources of access to content online”); id. at 50,
art. 2(3) (defining OCSPs as those that store, organize, and provide access to large
quantities of user-uploaded content).
5. See, e.g., Anti-piracy Group Urges CRTC to Create Website-Blocking System, CAN.
NEWS MEDIA (Jan. 29, 2018), http://canadanewsmedia.ca/2018/01/29/anti-
piracy-group-urges-crtc-to-create-website-blocking-system [https://perma.cc/YZ7A-
6V8H] (survey of debate between Barry Sookman in favor of copyright industry
groups’ call for more remedies against Internet-based infringement and Michael
Geist who argued that freedom of expression and traditional remedy standards
should prevail); Michael Geist, “Bill C-11 is No SOPA”: My Response (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2012/02/sookman-column-response [https://
perma.cc/VZ9G-HYMV] (summarizing Sookman’s arguments and replying); Mat-
thew Rimmer, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee on the
Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth), QUEENSL. UNIV. OF TECH.
(Apr. 21, 2015), https://works.bepress.com/matthew_rimmer/233/ [https://
perma.cc/K59T-ELXP]; Barry Sookman, Support for Creators: Pirate Streaming and the
Value Gap (Jan. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Sookman, Streaming], http://www.barrysook
man.com/2018/01/19/support-for-creators-pirate-streaming-and-the-value-gap-
my-op-ed-in-the-globe/ [https://perma.cc/QLL4-MWPR].
6. See INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Green Paper on
Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Internet Economy (July 31, 2013),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpa
per.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3DK-YBB9] (last visited June 6, 2019); INTERNET POL-
ICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Multistakeholder Forum on the DMCA No-
tice and Takedown System (2014-2015), https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-
resources/ip-policy/copyright/multistakeholder-forum-dmca-notice-and-takedown
-system [https://perma.cc/J5X8-PW8W].
3
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fected by the order, especially when equivalent intermediaries are tough
to find.7  In order to close the “value gap” when it comes to the communi-
cation of copyrighted and branded work on the Internet, there will be
demands to enjoin other operations or future acts by the same defendant,
and to enjoin nonparties and those otherwise not deemed infringers.8
Such orders may sweep in related accounts, noninfringing material, and
similar publications.9
In Europe, website blocking has joined subscriber termination and
content blocking as remedies against intermediaries who are not at fault
in terms of intent or even in terms of causation or copying.10  Blocking
remedies may evolve into a new form of Net regulation, alongside direct
infringement liability and authorization or indirect liability of various
kinds.11  The controversy goes back a decade or longer, as scholars warned
7. See, e.g., infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. R
8. See Giancarlo Frosio, Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy:
A European Digital Single Market Strategy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 19 (2017) [hereinaf-
ter Frosio, Reforming] (“In an attempt to close a ‘value gap’ between rightholders
and online platforms allegedly exploiting protected content, the [European Com-
mission’s upload filtering] proposal would implement filtering obligations for in-
termediaries . . . .  Apparently, the European Commission aligns its strategy for
online platforms to a globalized, ongoing move towards privatization of enforce-
ment online through algorithmic tools.”); Martin Senftleben, Adapting EU Trade-
mark Law to New Technologies—Back to Basics?, in CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 137, 176 (Christophe Geiger ed. 2013) [hereinafter Senf-
tleben, Adapting EU Trademark Law]; Martin Senftleben, Breathing Space for Cloud-
Based Business Models: Exploring the Matrix of Copyright Limitations, Safe Harbours and
Injunctions, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & E-COMM. L. 87 (2013) [hereinafter
Senftleben, Breathing Space] (surveying blocking and filtering orders against a vari-
ety of intermediaries and raising questions of burden, text-based filtering, safe
harbors, freedom of expression, and copyright exceptions for quotations and paro-
dies etc.); Sookman, supra note 5; Hannibal Travis, Myths of the Internet as the Death
of Old Media, 43 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 1 (2014) (describing campaigns for
filtering and site blocking from Napster and YouTube to Stop Online Piracy Act
and U.S. Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force); Promoting Invest-
ment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites, Part I, Before the Sub-
comm. on Intell. Prop., Competition, and the Internet, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of
Maria A. Pallante, Acting Register of Copyrights), http://www.copyright.gov/
docs/regstat031411.html [https://perma.cc/D6RU-8BFB] (making policy-based
case for site blocking and intermediary responsibilities in light of rising tide of
piracy).
9. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 23, 108, 152. R
10. See MARTIN HUSOVEC, INJUNCTIONS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES IN THE EURO-
PEAN UNION: ACCOUNTABLE BUT NOT LIABLE? 3-4, 101, 195-97 (Lionel Bentley et al.
eds., 2017); see also Frosio, Reforming, supra note 8; Senflteben, Breathing Space, supra R
note 8.  One study mentions direct liability, secondary and “authorisation” liability,
joint tortfeasance, and criminal modes of liability (such as aiding and abetting,
conspiring, instigating, and inducing) as options. See Pekka Savola, Blocking Injunc-
tions and Website Operators’ Liability for Copyright Infringement for User-Generated Links,
36 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 279 (2014).
11. See Husovec, supra note 10, at 3-4, 101, 195-97; see also Christina Angelo- R
poulos, Are Blocking Injunctions Against ISPs Allowed in Europe? Copyright Enforcement
in the Post-Telekabel EU Legal Landscape, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 812 (2014),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Christina_Angelopoulos/publication/2807
4
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of biased hosts and indexes, conflicts with settled principles of “no moni-
toring obligations,” and invasions of the freedom of expression.12  In
many cases, hyperlinking does not copy a work or make a commercial use
of a trademark in connection with a service; automated content forward-
ing, reproduction for hosting or caching, and transmission may also avoid
liability doctrines.13  Hyperlinking liability therefore restrains the legal
provision of facts.
62113_Are_blocking_injunctions_against_ISPs_allowed_in_Europe_Copyright_en
forcement_in_the_post-Telekabel_EU_legal_landscape/links/56c1c5f808aeedba
0567a602.pdf?origin=publication_detail [https://perma.cc/K7PK-LAF7] (while
under E-Commerce Directive of European Union, freedom to send and receive
speech was protected, European Court of Justice in 2014 permitted Internet ser-
vice providers to be enjoined from providing user access to specific third-party
websites subject to certain procedural protections for the providers from con-
tempt-like penalties and for users from excessive invasion of their freedom to ac-
cess information); Lukas Feiler, Website Blocking Injunctions Under EU and U.S.
Copyright Law—Slow Death of the Global Internet or Emergence of the Rule of National
Copyright Law? (TTLF Working Paper No. 13, 2012), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/203758/doc/slspublic/feiler_
wp13.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPT8-UPZV] (warning of harm to Internet from
website blocking injunctions and active monitoring of user behavior); Arno Lod-
der & Puck Pol, ISP Blocking and Filtering: On the Shallow Justification in Case Law
Regarding Effectiveness of Measures, 8 EUR. J.L. TECH. (2017), https://ejlt.org/arti-
cle/view/517/758/ [https://perma.cc/37KY-76YY] (due to tests for injunctive re-
lief that overlook “impact on lawful users of the internet,” injunctions blocking the
availability of websites mean that in Europe, “the role of ISPs is moved further in
the direction of policing the internet”); cf. Cory Doctorow, What’s Next for Europe’s
Censorship Plan?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deep
links/2018/10/whats-next-europes-internet-censorship-plan-0 [https://perma.cc/
69TN-G3PN] (“Members of the EU Parliament voted to advance the new Copy-
right Directive, even though it contained . . . Article 13 (‘Censorship Machines’)
that would filter everything everyone posts to online platforms to see if matches a
crowdsourced database of ‘copyrighted works’ that anyone could add anything
to . . . .”). See generally Jeremy De Beer & Christopher Clemmer, Global Trends in
Online Copyright Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49
JURIMETRICS J. 375 (2009).
12. See, e.g., Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011);
De Beer & Clemmer, supra note 11, at 400, 402; Giancarlo Frosio, The Death of ‘No
Monitoring Obligations’: A Story of Untameable Monsters, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH.
& E-COMM. L. 199 (2017); Frosio, Reforming, supra note 8, at 19; Seth Kreimer, R
Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the
Weakest Link, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 23-24, 87-90 (2006); Mark Lemley, et al., Don’t
Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34 (2011), https://www.stanfor-
dlawreview.org/online/dont-break-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/D2AV-
QA8X]; Lodder & Pol, supra note 11; Felix Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of
Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 347-49 (2011) (discussing
whether copyright liability should be transferrable from direct infringers to in-
termediaries, as it typically is not under section 230 of the Communications De-
cency Act with respect to libel or invasion of privacy (citing Joseph P. Liu, Copyright
and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 435-37 (2007))); Laurence Tribe,
The “Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA) Violates the First Amendment (Dec. 6, 2011),
https://www.serendipity.li/cda/tribe-legis-memo-on-SOPA-12-6-11-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5EFS-593B].
13. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2018) (safe harbor for Internet conduits);
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2013)
5
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A new global culture of rigorous enforcement of legal rights against
ISPs and cloud technology providers will face some import barriers before
permeating U.S. jurisdictions.  In particular, irreparable injury and the
other eBay factors might prompt courts to reject demands that in-
termediaries such as search engines cease delivering hyperlinks to websites
or apps that communicate infringing material to members of the public.14
A rote application of certain copyright and trademark precedents could
result in the services upon which Internet speech relies being subjected to
injunctive relief simply because the service providers could terminate cli-
ent accounts or content; the affected services might include “neutral” ser-
vices such as domain name services, content delivery networks (CDNs),
(mere knowledge that a hyperlink, information location tool, or other Internet
service may be used to infringe does not result in inducement liability for infringe-
ment); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir. 2004) (operator of software that creates a content-sharing community may not
be liable for aiding and abetting or be vicariously responsible for infringement by
the software users/the community, due to lack of knowledge, failure to facilitate
particular infringing acts, no right or ability to control user conduct, etc.), rev’d on
other grounds, 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
2d 1195, 1202 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (hyperlinking to infringing copies is not a
distribution of the copies); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, No. 00 CIV.
4660(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (same); Mark Mas-
nick, Did Homeland Security Make up a Non-Existent Criminal Contributory Infringement
Rule in Seizing Domain Names?, TECHDIRT (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20110104/12324012513/did-homeland-security-make-up-non-existent-
criminal-contributory-infringement-rule-seizing-domain-names.shtml [https://
perma.cc/8AFL-DWX2]; Shane McDougall, ICE Under Fire: Impropriety of Domain
Name Seizures, SETON HALL UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (2013),
http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1267&context=student_
scholarship [https://perma.cc/2HV4-XPQF] (collecting cases). But see Perfect 10
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2007) (where Google stored
thumbnails of plaintiff’s copyrighted images and links to where websites distrib-
uted “copies to a worldwide market,” giving “worldwide audience of users . . . ac-
cess,” it could be liable if on remand the district court determined that it knew
infringing images of plaintiff came up on its search engine and failed to take “sim-
ple” steps it could have to reduce infringement); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (helping users find location of infringing
copies on other users’ hard drives could lead to contributory and vicarious copy-
right infringement); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (linking to copy protection circumvention software as trafficking
in software designed or adapted for circumvention of measures that control access
to or copying of work under 17 U.S.C. § 1201); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah
Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999) (hyperlinking to
infringing copies as contributory copyright infringement); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Cloud-
flare, Inc., CV 16-5051-GW(AFMx), slip op. at 9-12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2018) (cit-
ing Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1170) (knowledge plus server space or other aid in
distribution results in contributory liability).
14. These barriers to overextensive remedies are in addition to the major bar-
rier posed by section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which has been
read very broadly, in the view of some commentators too broadly, for example in
immunizing certain acts that are leading to or aiding and abetting invasions of
privacy. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just
Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 468-69 (2018);
Wu, supra note 2, at 347-49.
6
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payment processors, search engines, hosting services, and other in-
termediaries.15  More nuanced approaches may guide courts away from
such outcomes, such as the searching inquiries into irreparable injury and
the other eBay factors that are familiar in patent law and in other contexts
such as libel law.16
Existing studies have explored the empirical question of how eBay
shaped the availability of injunctions against infringement.17  Other schol-
ars have analyzed irreparable harm or due process and related procedural
questions when it comes to enjoining intermediaries,18 and prospective
15. See, e.g., McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC v. Khan, 323 F. Supp. 3d
488, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that permanent injunction could extend to do-
main registries acting in active concert and participation with defendants); ALS
Scan, Inc., slip op. (issuing order to content delivery network [CDN] and Internet
protocol addressing service of infringer(s)); Tapestry, Inc. v. 2012coachout-
lets.com, No. 17-24561-Civ-Scola, 2018 WL 704864, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2018)
(issuing order to Microsoft to delist websites from search engines under All Writs
Act (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a))); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. PMD Technologie UG,
No.: 2:16-cv-7210-AB(Ex), 2016 WL 11002377 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016) (issuing
order to potential domain name registrars or registries of defendant or used by
those in active concert or participation with them); Elsevier Inc. v. Sci-Hub, No. 15-
cv-4282, 2017 WL 3868800 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2017) (issuing order to top-level do-
main registries for infringers); Arista Records, LLC v. Vasilenko, No. 1:15-CV-
21450, slip op. (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2017) (issuing order to CDN of infringer(s));
Elsevier, Inc. v. Han, No. 16 Civ. 1245 (RA), slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (in
copyright action, ordering domain name registries to transfer names to plaintiffs);
Am. Bridal & Prom Indus. Ass’n v. Affordablebridaldresses.com, No. 3:14-cv-2311
(AET), slip op. (D.N.J. June 3, 2015) (ordering Google, Bing, and other search
engines and marketplaces to delist dozens of domain names, claiming that these
third parties are in “privity” with domains’ owners); Arista Records, LLC v. Tkach,
No. 1:15-CV-03801, slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. preliminary injunction issued June 1,
2015) (issuing order to anyone working in active concert and participation with
defendant against linking to its website or owning/controlling its domain name),
subsequent proceedings at 122 F. Supp. 3d 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that prelimi-
nary injunction applied to CDN and that domain name registrar had already com-
plied with it); Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, 11 Civ. 3983(PAC 4), slip
op. (S.D.N.Y. order issued Aug. 4, 2011) (regarding forfeiture of domain names
linking to infringement); Defendant’s Supp. Memo. on Motion to Clarify, Certify
Interloc. Appeal, & Stay, ALS Scan, Inc. v. Cloudflare, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-05051-GW-
AFM (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2018) (challenging ALS Scan order); Non-Party Cloud-
flare, Inc.’s Corrected Reply in Supp. of Rule 60(B) Mot. to Vacate the Court’s
March 23, 2017 Order, No. 15-cv-21450 (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 11, 2017) (seeking to
vacate Arista Records order); Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellant Puerto 80
Projects S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11-3390-cv, 2011 WL 4440567 (2d Cir. 2011)
(critiquing seizure order in Puerto 80 Projects); Anne Edmundson, Paul Schmitt,
Nick Feamster & Jennifer Rexford, OCDN: Oblivious Content Distribution Networks,
arXiv preprint No. arXiv:1711.01478, draft at 1-3, (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1711.01478.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WVV-LS5D]; see also infra notes 15, 101. Com-
pare also infra note 109 (collecting cases ordering parties to request removal by
search engines).
16. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 197-198, 202 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 81-83, 108, 122, 193, 209-10, 226, 238, 262 and accompany-
ing text.
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compensation as an alternative to permanent injunctions.19  Research
with somewhat deeper roots pre-eBay involves doctrinal and policy-based
calls for tailoring injunctive relief carefully to the precise conduct found to
be unlawful (and registered, in the case of copyrights and patents), to
avoid ambiguity and censorship.20  These bodies of research suggest a vari-
ety of reasons why injunctions should not issue against Internet in-
termediaries such as CDNs or search engines: Rule 65(d)’s requirement of
reasonable detail and the avoidance of vague obligations, the plaintiff’s
licensing of its rights to third parties as evidence of no irreparable injury,
the availability of monetary relief as an adequate legal remedy, concerns
about overcompensation due to injunctions against complex methods or
products, and the hardship to innocent third parties or noninfringing ac-
tivities beneficial to the public under the remaining factors of eBay.21
Part II of this Article is devoted to Rule 65(d) and the framing of
injunctions, especially those extending to intermediaries’ conduct such as
the provision of cloud services.  Part III argues that the mere loss of con-
trol over an intellectual property right or rights should not lead to an in-
ference of irreparable injury, and that courts should be more precise
about the mechanisms and actual impact of the illegal injury.  Part IV ex-
plains how certain forms of injunction against cloud service providers
threaten to create new forms of secondary liability without knowledge or
veil-piercing, and to violate the free speech rights of the defendant or of
the public in general by covering lawful activity.
19. See Tomas Go´mez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu of Final Injunc-
tions in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661, 1664 (2010); George
Newcombie et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a Post-eBay World, 4
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549 (2008); Michael Brandt, Note, Compulsory Licenses in the After-
math of eBay v. Mercexchange, L.L.C.: The Courts’ Authority to Impose Prospective Com-
pensatory Relief for Patent Infringement, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 699, 707-09 (2008); Tim
Carlton, Note, The Ongoing Royalty: What Remedy Should a Patent Holder Receive When
a Permanent Injunction Is Denied?, 43 GA. L. REV. 543 (2009).
20. See infra notes 41, 45, 81-84, 209-10 and accompanying text. See generally
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019)
(holding that Copyright Office must register or reject an application for copyright
registration with respect to a work before suit may be filed to remedy infringement
of that work).  See also John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New
Expansion of Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
1821 1823, 1834-35 (2013) (discussing copyright lawsuit against Veoh, a user-gen-
erated content and video-sharing platform that went bankrupt due to litigation
costs, after its investors were also sued, although it largely prevailed against in-
fringement charges on grounds of DMCA safe harbor (citing UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013)).
21. See infra note 135 (irreparable injury); infra note 137 (adequate remedy);
and infra notes 132-133 (balance of hardships and public interest).
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II. CLOUD TECHNOLOGIES AND EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE
A. Precisely Drawn Notice vs. “Obey the Law” Injunctions
Cloud services may be served with injunctions that vary in scope in
terms of the conduct proscribed or commanded.  The injunction could
order a defendant found to be in violation of a law to obey the entire body
of law.22  Or it could order the defendant to obey that specific law, or,
more restrictively, to obey that law in a specific domain or factual scenario
or victim context.23  Most restrictively, it could order the defendant to de-
sist from or correct the specific practice that violated the law, in a very
concrete way perhaps.24  It has long been the practice of copyright and
22. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2017)
(along with narrowing provisions tethered to plaintiffs, noting provision of injunc-
tion against “engaging in any other activity that violates, directly or indirectly, 17
U.S.C. §§ 1201(a) or 106”); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 1310, 1318-19 (2d
Cir. 1981) (district court had enjoined defendant from “nearly any sort of violation
of the securities laws” that would defraud a person); Proactive Dealer Sols., LLC v.
Richards, No. 3:17-cv-00111-FDW, slip op. (W.D.N.C. Mar. 13, 2018) (enjoining
defendant from any use of plaintiff’s copyrighted works whether registered or not,
and any use of trademark confusingly similar to plaintiff’s registered mark); Over-
stock.com, Inc. v. Visocky, No. 1:17-cv-01331 (LMB/TCB), 2018 WL 5046673 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 17, 2018) (adopting permanent injunction against defendant “otherwise
infringing plaintiff’s intellectual property rights”); Hakkasan, LV, LLC v. VIP,
Unltd., LLC, No. 2: 13-cv-01999-JCM-NJK, slip op. (D. Nev. amended preliminary
injunction order entered Nov. 18, 2013) (enjoining any use in commerce of any of
plaintiff’s marks or something confusingly similar thereto); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc.,
765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (defendant enjoined from “infringing by
any means” any broadcast television “programming in which any plaintiff owns a
copyright”), aff’d, 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012); SEC v. Netelkos, 592 F. Supp. 906,
921-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (enjoining defendant from violating any of the securities
laws); State v. NY Movers Tariff Bur., 48 Misc. 2d 225, 256, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Special Term, N.Y. Cty. 1965) (enjoining defendants from agreeing or conspiring
together to “restrict or prevent competition”).
23. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 132-33
(1969) (enjoining defendant from conspiring against plaintiff to slow its entry into
any foreign market, even though findings focused on Canada); SEC v. Life Part-
ners Holdings, Inc., 854 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2017) (district court properly enjoined
defendant from future violations of same law, involving reporting financial results
in non-misleading way on Form 10-K or 10-Q to SEC, or aiding and abetting such
violations); SEC v. Wash. Inv. Network, 475 F.3d 392, 392-95, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(district court enjoined defendant from violating the specific securities laws cited
in commission’s complaint); SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005)
(same); Savoy, 665 F.2d at 1318 (in securities field, injunctions “formulated in lan-
guage closely paralleling the statute transgressed by the defendant” repeatedly
deemed proper) (collecting cases); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d
478, 483-84 (7th Cir. 1946) (district court enjoined defendant from committing
any violation of law with same effect); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp.
679, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (defendants enjoined from violating any of plaintiffs’
copyrights or trademarks).
24. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United Sates, 221 U.S. 1, 77 (1911) (“It may
be conceded that ordinarily where it was found that acts had been done in viola-
tion of the statute, adequate measure of relief would result from restraining the
doing of such acts in the future.” (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375
(1905)); United Constr. Prods., Inc. v. Tile Tech, Inc., 843 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed.
9
Travis: Enjoining the Cloud: Equity, Irreparability, and Remedies
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
41591-vlr_64-3 Sheet No. 37 Side B      08/28/2019   13:29:48
41591-vlr_64-3 Sheet No. 37 Side B      08/28/2019   13:29:48
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\64-3\VLR303.txt unknown Seq: 10 28-AUG-19 12:41
402 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64: p. 393
trademark owners, as well as some federal agencies and libel victims, to
seek and obtain injunctions of the first type.25  As set forth below, this
practice has come into question under the federal rules.
In the intellectual property domain, many decisions go beyond
enjoining infringement of the specific assets that have been pled
and proven infringed.26  The Supreme Court’s Hartford-Empire doc-
Cir. 2016)) (holding that “injunctions have satisfactory scope when they prohibit
‘infringement of the patent by the adjudicated devices and infringement by de-
vices not more than colorably different from the adjudicated devices’” (quoting
Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 383 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); Beastie Boys v.
Monster Energy Co., 87 F. Supp. 3d 672, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (enjoining defendant
from use of specific infringing video); HarperCollins Publishers v. Open Road In-
tegrated Media, 58 F. Supp. 3d 380, 387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (enjoining defendant
from infringing on any other books plaintiff had acquired electronic rights by
means of “same” contractual language as used for book on which complaint was
based); Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1069-70 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (enjoining defendant from copying any protected elements from plain-
tiff’s website or inducing or aiding anyone to do the same, or circumventing tech-
nical measures that control access to site, e.g. CAPTCHAs); see also Savoy, 665 F.2d
at 1317-18 (“As the Court has stated elsewhere, ‘[a] federal court has broad power
to restrain acts which are of the same type or class as unlawful acts which the court
has found to have been committed . . . .’” (footnote omitted) (quoting NLRB v.
Express Publ’g Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435 (1941)); Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co.,
661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (injunction ordering defendant not to construc-
tively discharge employees who became pregnant like the plaintiff, under similar
circumstances, was appropriate, even though plaintiff was awarded damages and
apparently not reinstated); Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co., 336 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir.
1964) (“[When] the activity which gave rise to the litigation has been completed,
where there is a likelihood that the violation will be resumed  . . . . [an injunction]
may be sufficiently broad and general to enjoin any practices which would consti-
tute violations of the [Fair Labor Standards] Act’s provisions dealing with mini-
mum wages, overtime and the keeping of records.” (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321, 327 (1944))).
25. See Dorothy Heyl, “Obey the Law” Injunctions Questioned in Some Courts,
N.Y.L.J. (July 10, 2010), https://www.milbank.com/images/content/9/8/989/
072010-NYLJ-DHeyl.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3KB-C9EK].
26. See, e.g., Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(enjoining defendant from infringing copyrights on Donald Duck, Goofy, and
Pluto even though copyrights in suit involved Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse);
Bird-B-Gone Inc. v. Haierc Indus. Co., No. 2:18-cv-819-APG, 2018 WL 5816630 (D.
Nev. permanent injunction entered Nov. 6, 2018) (enjoining defendant from mak-
ing, using, offering to sell, selling, or distributing the products found to infringe
plaintiff’s patents); Patagonia, Inc. v. Sauls, No. 2:18-cv-3868-FMO, slip op. (C.D.
Cal. final judgment and permanent injunction entered July 30, 2018) (generally
enjoining defendant from violating plaintiff’s copyrights or using its trademarks or
false designation of origin or false or misleading statements of fact about plaintiff);
CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Apartment Hunters, Inc., No. 8:15-cv-02111-JLS, slip op.
at 3 (C.D. Cal. judgment and permanent injunction entered Mar. 27, 2017) (in-
junction against “infringing, by any means, directly or indirectly, any exclusive
rights under the Copyright Act in” any photographs or videos owned or controlled
as to at least one exclusive right by plaintiff, or publishing or displaying or other-
wise misappropriating under state law plaintiff’s property listing data); Rovio
Entm’t, Ltd. v. Allstar Vending, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (de-
fendant “permanently enjoined from further violating the copyrights and trade-
marks at issue in this case”); Pods Enters., LLC v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 126 F. Supp.
10
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trine27 states that an injunction should not reach all possible legal viola-
tions; this could be particularly important to ISPs and cloud providers,
which have a wide variety of users.28  The doctrine has constitutional as
well as procedural implications, for enjoining “any” other infringing acts
does not “prevent uncertainty and confusion” as to the scope of the de-
cree, and may create “a decree too vague to be understood.”29  The Su-
preme Court has warned against a blanket injunction against illegality
through new “method[s].”30  A later case explained this doctrine as re-
quiring that each form of illegality by the same actor must be tested and
analyzed separately.31
3d 1263, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (defendant enjoined from using any term confus-
ingly similar to or dilutive of plaintiff’s marks); Teller v. Dodge, No. 2:12-CV-591
JCM(GWF), 2014 WL 4929413 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2014) (enjoining defendant
“from infringing on plaintiff’s copyright and trademark,” apparently not all of his
copyrights); WPIX, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (enjoining defendant from infringing
any copyright in plaintiffs’ broadcast programming); Encyclopaedia Britannica
Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1187 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (enjoining in-
fringement of any of plaintiff’s existing works and perhaps its “future registered
works” as well (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ass’n of Am. Med.
Colls. v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358, 1364 n.15 (N.D.N.Y. 1980))); Orth-O-Vision,
Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Standard
Oil, 221 U.S. at 77-78 (it is “essential” to “forbid the doing in the future of acts like
those which we have found to have been done in the past which would be violative
of the statute”); Wash. Inv. Network, 475 F.3d at 407 (holding that this is type of
precision as to likeness of violations that Rule 65(d) requires).
27. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 410 (1945).
28. See Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d
579, 587 (5th Cir. 2013) (reciting doctrine in trade secret case); Anheuser-Busch
Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 653 (8th Cir. 1984) (reciting doctrine in
trademark case); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 83 (3d
Cir. 1982) (same); Savoy, 665 F.2d at 1318 (explaining doctrine in securities case);
Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(reciting doctrine in copyright, computer fraud/abuse, and contract/tort case);
Iconix, Inc. v. Tokuda, 457 F. Supp. 2d 969, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (reciting doc-
trine in copyright case); TC Forum at Carlsbad, LLC v. Thomas Enters., Inc., No.
16-cv-2119 DMS, slip op. (S.D. Cal. default judgment entered Aug. 14, 2017) (recit-
ing doctrine in trademark case); Malibu Media, LLC v. Gonzales, No. H-16-2406,
2017 WL 2985641 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2017) (reciting doctrine in copyright case);
Teller v. Dodge, No. 2:12-CV-591 JCM, slip op. (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2014) (reciting
doctrine in copyright case); Fairfield Resorts, Inc. v. Fairfield Mountains Prop.
Owners Ass’n Inc., No. 1:06CV191, slip op. (W.D.N.C. 2007) (reciting doctrine in
trademark case).
29. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974); see also Ideal Toy Corp., 685
F.2d at 83.
30. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 401 (1908) (“The defend-
ants ought to be informed, as accurately as the case permits, what they are forbid-
den to do.  Specific devices are mentioned in the bill, and they stand prohibited.”).
31. See Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 483-84 (7th Cir.
1946) (order should not have enjoined perpetrator from “formulating or putting
into operation any other practice or plan which has the purpose or effect of”
achieving same thing as price-fixing plan found unlawful, because “some other
plan of which the Commission might complain should . . . be tested” in the courts
first (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Some cases go further and enjoin any infringement of the plaintiff’s
or plaintiffs’ rights, including rights potentially not yet pled or adjudi-
cated.32  This seems to be improper under patent law, because there is no
case or controversy as to unasserted claims of a patent, let alone liability,
irreparable injury, public interest support, etc.33  Unasserted claims pre-
sent different issues and cannot be lumped in with asserted claims.34  Cop-
yright law has been treated differently because registration is not a
condition of protection, and some courts hold that an injunction may
cover “closely related” copyrights as “infringement of ‘a copyright.’”35
Therefore many courts have held that an injunction may reach unregis-
tered copyrights.36  Others have said, either on the basis of outdated law,
or on grounds not reached by the courts allowing orders to reach unregis-
tered copyrights, that registration either is jurisdictional or is a required
element of an infringement pleading.37  A jurisdictional type of ruling is
not viable under Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, but an unregistered copyright
may not give rise to a viable claim.38  Like unasserted claims of a patent,
32. See Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (plain-
tiff’s other copyrighted characters); Iconix, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d at 999-1000 (in-
fringing copyrights in code of any of plaintiff’s software).
33. Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Indus. Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750-53 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (complaint alleged infringement of seventeen of twenty-five claims, and
plaintiff expressed intention not to assert remaining claims, so no case or contro-
versy existed over unasserted claims); Gammino v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., No. 10-
2493, 2011 WL 3240830, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2011) (declining to decide on
claims because they presented different issues from asserted claims, which had al-
ready been subject of court’s decision).
34. See Fox Grp., Inc. v. Cree, Inc., 700 F.3d 1300, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“There was no case or controversy with respect to the unasserted claims at the
time of the summary judgment motions; therefore the district court did not have
jurisdiction over the unasserted claims.” (citing Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnos-
tic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2012))); IPS Grp. Inc. v. Duncan Sols.,
Inc., No. 15-cv-1526-CAB, slip op. (S.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2017) (where defendants
moved for summary judgment of non-infringement of plaintiff’s patent by two
products, but plaintiff conceded products did not infringe asserted claims, there
was no case or controversy as to infringement of unasserted claims); A Pty Ltd. v.
HomeAway, Inc., No. 1-15-CV-158 RP, 2015 WL 5883364, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 8,
2015) (“Federal Circuit has made clear that a court lacks jurisdiction to decide the
validity of unasserted claims.”); Gammino, 2011 WL 3240830, at *9-10 (declining to
decide on claims because they presented different issues from asserted claims,
which had already been subject of court’s decision).
35. Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 n.17 (11th Cir. 1984) (em-
phasis in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 502(a)) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 408(a)).
36. See id.; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1154
n.1 (9th Cir. 2007); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir.
1994); Tattoo Art, Inc. v. TAT Int’l LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d 634, 659-64 (E.D. Va.
2011). See generally Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); Fourth
Estate Pub. Benefit v. Wall-Street.com, 856 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. granted,
138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019).
37. See Dowbenko v. Google, Inc., 582 F. App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (citing Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 157).
38. See id.; Adlife Mktg. & Commc’ns Co. v. Best Yet Mkt., Inc., No. 2: 17-cv-
2978, 2017 WL 4564763, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2017); Malibu Media, LLC v.
12
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protection may exist for unregistered or unpled copyrights or trademarks,
but liability is not shown, let alone irreparable injury.
Potentially lawful conduct should not be enjoined without confirming
that the elements of ownership and infringing acts are met and that eBay is
satisfied as to each type of infringement.  A libel case from 2015 provides
an example.  The district court’s injunction would have required the de-
fendant, found responsible for libel by a jury, to take down the website on
which libels had been published.  The appellate court reversed, holding
that because the district court had not determined that every statement on
the website was libelous of the plaintiffs, the site could not be enjoined as
a whole.  An injunction, it said, must not be overbroad, vague, open-en-
ded, or lacking “support in the jury verdict or, so far as appears, in the
district judge’s own evaluation of the evidence.”39  Enjoining an entire
website or other Internet account tends to prohibit legitimate speech.40
B. Precision as Final Adjudication
The judiciary’s primary role might be said to act as a bulwark against
Congress in this area, as in other areas involving the Bill of Rights and the
separation of powers.  In some intellectual property contexts, the Constitu-
tion is said to require a final judicial determination of infringement prior
to the enjoining of the availability or transmission of a specific communi-
cation.41  The Supreme Court has warned repeatedly that a broad-brush
approach is a violation of the First Amendment and due process.42  Thus,
Gonzales, No. H-16-2406, 2017 WL 2985641, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2017); Tat-
too Art, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 659-64.
39. McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2015).
40. See Caroline Craig, DMCA “Reform” Harbors Return of SOPA, INFOWORLD
(May 20, 2016), https://www.infoworld.com/article/3072456/dmca-reform-bill-
harbors-return-of-sopa.html [https://perma.cc/2FLD-5XCU].
41. Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellec-
tual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 167 (1998).
42. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989) (holding that
seizure of multiple expressive works due to illegality of some of them is unconstitu-
tional); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (“[O]nly a judicial determi-
nation in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression [and] only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to
impose a valid final restraint.”); Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F.
Supp. 2d 606, 619, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holdings of Supreme Court mandate that
a specific work be adjudged unlawful after adversary hearing before its sale or dis-
tribution is prohibited by law); cf. Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886,
903 (1st Cir. 1993); McDougall, supra note 13, draft at 25-33. See generally Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997) (distinguishing a backward-looking sanction “by
an agency that had been regulating radio stations for decades, targeted a specific
broadcast that represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional program
content in order to designate when—rather than whether—it would be permissi-
ble to air such a program in that particular medium” from forward-looking “cate-
gorical prohibitions [that] are not limited to particular times”); Carroll v.
President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968); Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437, 445 (1957).
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the legality of a specific work should be decided before its illegality is
“remedied.”43
Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh argue that to maintain parity be-
tween remedies against libel and intellectual-property infringements, a fi-
nal adjudication that expressive material is infringing must precede an
injunction against it, unless the defendant has agreed not to disclose or
use the property, such as a trade secret, amounting to a waiver.44  On this
issue, two traditions run up against one another.  First, there is a trend to
grant injunctive relief pending trial on a close factual or legal question
that is yet to be resolved.  Particularly where property rights are at issue,
preservation of the remaining value of the property and prevention of fur-
ther harm to the plaintiff and the public might require this.45  Second,
libel and obscenity law pose barriers to restricting speech pending a final
decision of a censor or even of a judge, and to lumping works together.46
The Supreme Court has on three occasions rejected analogies be-
tween copyright or trademark law and obscenity or censorship on na-
tional-security grounds, and this may have been the consensus in the
courts of appeal even before these decisions.47  In the wake of these deci-
sions, it may be that the rule against prior restraints only applies to con-
tent-based restraints, which do not neutrally apply via a rule of general
43. See Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that an
“injunction against speech sometimes may pass constitutional testing if it follows
an adjudication that the expression is unprotected, and the injunction itself is nar-
rowly tailored to avoid censoring protected speech” (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973))); Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 657
(similar).
44. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 41.
45. See id. nn.7-27 (citing, inter alia, Donaldson v. Becket, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 17
Parl. Hist. Eng. 953, 989-90 (H.L. 1774)).
46. See id. at 171-72 & nn.114-17 (citing, inter alia, Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 66 (1989); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-61
(1965)); see also id. at 170 (citing, inter alia, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973); Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)).
47. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-21 (2003) (rejecting “uncom-
monly strict” or “heightened” scrutiny of copyright legislation under First Amend-
ment (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987);
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985))); Lem-
ley & Volokh, supra note 41 at 166-67 nn.91-98, 169 n.104, 182 n.163, 187 n.191,
218 n.312 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 558; S.F. Arts & Athletics,, 483
U.S. at 532; Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758-59
(9th Cir. 1978)); see also S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 536-37 (rejecting dissent-
ing Justice Brennan’s analogy of law restricting use of term “Olympics” on amateur
athletic events to other overbroad content-based laws); Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders,
604 F.2d at 1188; Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 758-59 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977)).  For pre-Zacchini case law, see Mel-
ville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright vs. the First
Amendment, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 255 (1970).
14
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application.48  Intermediate scrutiny may apply even to content-neutral
prior restraints, or there may be no First Amendment scrutiny or only ra-
tional basis review once a law is deemed to pass intermediate scrutiny, for
example copyright law or the law of the Olympic symbol.49
Courts have taken some care to tailor relief in copyright cases to what
their actual adjudication with due process covers, despite case law sug-
gesting that these concerns are adequately handled by the idea-expression
dichotomy, the restriction of trademark infringement doctrines to com-
mercial speech, and fair use in copyright.  For example, in Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., the court held it to be improper to enjoin the publi-
cation of a book due to the use of the same characters and plot, albeit to
criticize or parody the author and original work, “as a prior restraint on
speech because the public had not had access to Randall’s ideas or view-
point in the form of expression that she chose.”50  Similarly, in another
case, the defendant was found liable for infringing photographs from
plaintiff’s real estate listings database, but the plaintiff sought an injunc-
tion against infringement of any “copyrighted content” from the database,
which the court rejected as “not sufficiently specific,” from the standpoint
of both ownership and infringing acts.51  In still other cases, the courts
allowed a defendant to continue to operate without infringing a plaintiff’s
rights.52
48. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449-53 (2d Cir.
2001); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126-27 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 17 (Cal. 2003); cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at
218-21 (suggesting that retrospective copyright term extension was content-neu-
tral, although petitioners’ argument was being characterized in passage); Sindi,
896 F.3d at 30-34 (noting that injunction against defamatory statements was con-
tent-based, after calling it a prior restraint, because it was based on words used);
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (rais-
ing First Amendment issue with injunction that affected alleged infringer’s ability
to convey “ideas or viewpoint in the form of expression that she [originally]
chose”).  See generally Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-69 (distinguishing direct impact of
speech from its secondary effects or incidental impact: “ ‘Listeners’ reaction to
speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation’” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134
(1992))).
49. Compare, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FEC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (inter-
mediate scrutiny of must-carry provisions of cable law, which might restrain cable
operator’s choice to add more channels with objective of forcing them to preserve
broadcast channels by carrying them), with Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (suggesting ra-
tional basis review once court confirms that a reform to Copyright Act does not
alter traditional features of copyright, such as idea-expression dichotomy, fair use,
and terms that are limited by some metric (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S.
522))).
50. 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).
51. Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 904 F.
Supp. 2d 530, 533 (D. Md. 2012).
52. See infra notes 13, 81, 83, 105-106, 109, 122-123, 189, 237 and accompany-
ing text; see also Exec. Home Care Franchising LLC v. Marshall Health Corp., 642
F. App’x 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2016) (even though franchisee violated trademark li-
censing and franchising agreement, surrender of trademarked “marketing materi-
15
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Decisions as to whether to narrowly tailor trademark injunctions seem
to be all over the map.  As William McGeveran and Mark McKenna ex-
plain, while some courts have urged a laser-like focus on confusing uses of
a mark, others have adopted a blunderbuss approach to grant an injunc-
tion against using any similar mark in the context of the defendant’s busi-
ness.53  McGeveran and McKenna criticize this move as enjoining
noninfringing conduct and even conduct that hopes to dispel the confu-
sion or explain what led to the linkage of the parties in the view of the
public or of the courts.54  Notably, two cases that narrowly tailored injunc-
tions post-dated eBay, and two on the other side seem to reflect the knee-
jerk approach that prevailed in copyright and trademark pre-eBay.55
In First Amendment law, there are two or more forms of narrow tai-
loring.  The most onerous is a least-restrictive-means requirement, in
which, even though the governmental interest meets the applicable First
Amendment standard (significant, substantial, or compelling), the law will
not pass muster if the interest could be achieved with a narrower law or
other restriction on speech.56  A less onerous requirement examines
whether the law is more effective than it would be if it were narrower, even
though it would achieve the governmental interest to some degree once
als” and franchise premises meant that no injunction was justifiable); Danone, US,
LLC v. Chobani, LLC, No. 1.18-CV-11702, 2019 WL 760040, at *12-14 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 23, 2019) (inevitable sale-through or disposal of perishable foodstuffs with
false or misleading labels meant that injury was not irreparable); HarperCollins
Publishers LLC v. Open Road Integrated Media, LLP, 58 F. Supp. 3d 380, 386-87
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (continuing to allow defendant to operate by selling e-books that
might infringe authors’ copyright assignments of electronic rights to print pub-
lisher, although court enjoined sale, publication, or claim of authorization to pub-
lish certain e-books that print publisher obtained rights to using a particular form
of contract language); Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Adios! to the Irrepara-
ble Harm Presumption in Trademark Law, 107 TRADEMARK REP. 913, 948 (2017) (oper-
ating under different trade name and logos may mean that confusion with former
affiliate is not irreparable).
53. William McGeveran & Mark McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 253, 312-15 nn.278, 287-90, 294 (2013) (citing Voice of the Arab
World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2011); Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010); Westches-
ter Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 671 (5th Cir. 2000); CPC Int’l,
Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 459-61, 463 (4th Cir. 2000); Forschner Grp., Inc.
v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1997); E. & J. Gallo Winery v.
Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992); Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v.
Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800, 806 (2d Cir. 1981)).
54. See id. at 312-15.
55. See id. at 314, nn.288, 290 (contrasting Voice of the Arab World, 645 F.3d at
33; Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1176; Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 671; Forschner,
124 F.3d at 406).
56. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 & 789 n.6 (1989)
(discussing the distinction, and calling this form of tailoring “out of place” when it
comes to scrutiny of content-neutral laws restricting the time, place, or manner of
speech under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
16
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narrowed.57  This “reasonable fit” standard, however, could converge with
the former standard once case law is considered stating that there is no
reasonable fit if the government could achieve its interests by restricting
less speech, even though the restriction serves its interests.58
Intellectual property injunctions might be narrowly tailored under
one sense of that term or phrase and overbroad under another.  For exam-
ple, many injunctions including future works of the plaintiff, infringe-
ments of the same type, or other violations of the same body of law are not
narrowly tailored compared to an injunction focused on the particular fac-
tual scenario that gave rise to the infringement finding, under a least-re-
strictive-means conception of narrowly tailored.  On the other hand, more
copious injunctive language could be narrowly tailored in the sense of be-
ing more effective in promoting the congressional or public interest in
reducing the overall amount of infringement and closing the “value gaps”
between owners and users or infringers.
Scholars of “prophylactic” and “universal” injunctions are deeply di-
vided on the question of tailoring.  According to David Schoenbrod,
followed by Michael Morley, prospective and especially prospective pro-
phylactic injunctions—those reaching similar but lawful conduct—either
unnecessarily duplicate statutory prohibitions or undermine statutory
frameworks by prohibiting conduct that Congress (or the constitutional
framers) decided to permit.59  Similarly, Lemley and Volokh urge courts
in trademark cases to tailor injunctive relief to the advertising impact of
commercial speech specifically to tease out the commercial and noncom-
mercial aspects of a defendant’s speech or conduct.60  In that, they antici-
pated the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence on Internet domain names, which
allows an infringer or diluter of a trademark to continue to use the trade-
mark on parts of a website that criticize the mark owner or give the history
of the trademark dispute.61
57. See id.; Pom Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 777 F.3d 478, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(identifying standard “short of a least-restrictive-means standard” as “a ‘reasonable
fit’ between the particular means chosen and the government interest pursued”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Board of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
477, 480 (1989))).
58. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 358 (2002).
59. Michael T. Morley, Enforcing Equality: Statutory Injunctions, Equitable Balanc-
ing Under eBay, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 207, 217-
21 (citing David Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace
Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 629, 647-48
(1988))).
60. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 41, at n.272.
61. See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir.
2010) (limiting relief in Internet infringement case to advertising impact); Nissan
Motor Co. v. Nissan Comput. Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004) (defendant
should have been restricted from advertising cars on the like using domain name
based on his surname, nissan.com, but should not have been enjoined from criti-
cizing Nissan Motor, or engaging in non-confusing use of it).
17
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It has been said that a court may “permanently enjoin the future in-
fringement of works owned by the plaintiff but not in suit.”62  Even the
infringement of as-yet unregistered works has been justified under “eq-
uity,” without further elaboration.63  The cases announcing this rule in-
volved regularly published works of the same type, such as the Medical
College Admission Test (MCAT) and studies thereof, educational videos
intended for television broadcasts, movies or shows on HBO, or telephone
books.64  Another case often cited for the proposition is Wainright Securi-
ties; it referred generally to infringement and protecting the plaintiff’s
property, but it did not specifically analyze the registration issue.65
The line of cases allowing an injunction as to after-arising works and
similar infringements rests on an unstable and collapsing foundation after
eBay.  While one might have been able to say, pre-eBay, that an injunction
should be granted as a matter of course and irreparable injury presumed
for any copyright infringement, these assumptions may no longer be via-
ble.66  When an injunction against the adjudicated infringement repairs
the plaintiff’s injury, further recourse to the extraordinary remedy of an
injunction is improper.67  Also, the ability of the plaintiff to seek a con-
tempt citation for future conduct occurring in another judicial district un-
dermines due process.68  There may not even be a case or controversy
62. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Ency-
clopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1187 (W.D.N.Y.
1982)).
63. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp., 542 F. Supp. at 1187 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358,
1364 n.15 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing Wainright Secs., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d on other grounds, 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office,
474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
64. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 482 F. Supp. 1358 (MCAT); Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica Educ. Corp., 542 F. Supp. at 1160-66 (educational videos); Orth-O-Vision, 474 F.
Supp. at 675-79 (HBO); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv.,
Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 911 (W.D. Ark. 1974) (directory); S.  Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Donnelly, 35 F. Supp. 425, 429 (S.D. Fla. 1940) (directory).
65. Wainright Secs., 418 F. Supp. 620.
66. Compare, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (in-
junction should not follow from liability finding “as a matter of course” (citing
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982))), and Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 158 (2010) (court should not ask itself, why not
grant an injunction?), and eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388, 394
(2006) (disagreeing with Federal Circuit that injunctions against patent infringe-
ment should be the norm absent “exceptional” or “rare” facts), with Sony BMG
Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1867 (D. Mass. Dec. 1, 2009) (continu-
ing to presume irreparable injury after finding of infringement post-eBay); Lennon
v. Premise Media Corp., L.P., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 319-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(similar).
67. See Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 165-66; Morley, supra note 59, at 185-86, nn.37-50
(collecting cases).
68. See SEC v. Smyth, 420 F. 3d 1225, 1233 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005) (in addition
to violating Rule 65(d), an injunction against engaging in any fraudulent or mis-
leading sales or transaction practices in future would deny defendant right of jury
18
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under Article III regarding different aspects of the same intellectual prop-
erty asset—such as unasserted claims of a patent—let alone a different
asset.69  Many of the cases on future-registered copyrights being included
in an injunction against infringing the copyrights in suit predated the Su-
preme Court’s decision in 1983 that a party lacks standing to seek an in-
junction against conduct in the future that may be dissimilar to the
conduct that caused that party injury in the past, where that precise scena-
rio may not recur.70  Although the Walt Disney v. Powell decision post-dated
that, it was premised in part upon the automatic injunction rule in the
Ninth Circuit pre-eBay.71  Even before eBay, this rule rested on a shaky
foundation because it creates unconstitutional quasi-copyrights.72  After
eBay, it suffers the additional defect of grouping together injuries that
have distinct elements and varying degrees of irreparability depending on
context.
C. Precision as Reasonable Detail
Every injunction shall state in reasonable detail what is being prohib-
ited or mandated, and not by incorporating another document’s claims by
reference.73  This serves the due process requirement of “explicit notice”
before a punishment is handed down, and the administrability objective of
trial in district in which contempt citation was brought, and would undermine
statutory and constitutional entitlement to due process that would exist in new
enforcement proceeding); Heyl, supra note 25, at 1.
69. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
70. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983) (involving police
chokeholds without probable cause, which may be different than those preceded
by probable cause).
71. 897 F.2d 555, 567-68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Universal City Studios v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 464
U.S. 417 (1984); 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 14.06[B], at 14-55 to -56 (1989)).  It was also premised on the pre-eBay district
court decisions on future infringements, largely from the Second Circuit.
72. See Kristina Rosette, Back to the Future: How Federal Courts Create a Federal
Common-Law Copyright Through Permanent Injunctions Protecting Future Works, 2 J. IN-
TELL. PROP. L. 325, 349-56, 359 n.203 (1994) (noting that such after-arising works
may lack originality, fixation, and limited time requirements of U.S. CONST., art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8, the fixation requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 102, the registration requirement
of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)-(b), and the law’s other purportedly “carefully defined” and
“exact protections” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dowling v.
United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985))).
73. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; Digital Equip. Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 805 F.2d 380,
381-83 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (after citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a), holding that it would be
overbroad to enjoin defendant in trade secret action from designing or making
any product that implements any portion of plaintiff’s software protocols or speci-
fications); H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nat. Friction Prods. Corp., 568 F. 2d 24, 27 (7th
Cir. 1977) (in trade secrets action, holding that incorporating another document
into order was serious error); cf. Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d
1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting in trademark action that while on occasion a
document that specifies prohibited acts may be annexed to an order, “incorpora-
tion by reference should be the rare exception rather than the rule, and district
courts should be particularly cautious where the injunctive order is issued at the
19
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making interpretation simpler in enforcement.74  Merely implicit notice,
based on the factual background, the arguments in the pleadings, or the
statements of the court at the hearing, is not sufficient.75
Enjoining similar infringements should not be found to satisfy Rule
65(d) unless what sorts of infringements will be similar is well-defined.  In
the patent context, “specific terms” in the injunctive order for the infring-
ing acts are required by Rule 65(d) to prevent unnecessary contempt mo-
tions.76  There are many cases in the context of civil rights holding that
blanket orders not to commit similar violations in the future violate the
detail requirement of Rule 65(d).77  The conduct enjoined should be ade-
outset of litigation, before the receiving party has acquired a context for under-
standing the referenced document and the subject matter of the dispute”).
74. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1974) (styling due process re-
quirement as “basic fairness” and avoidance of vagueness); Regions Bank v.
Kaplan, 8:16-cv-2867-T-23AAS, 2017 WL 3446914, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2017)
(explaining administrability issue); see also Schmidt, 414 U.S. at 477 (precision facili-
tates appellate review); id. at 476 n.2 (“The judicial contempt power is a potent
weapon.  When it is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be
a deadly one.  Congress responded to that danger by requiring that . . . those who
must obey [court orders] will know what the court . . . means to forbid.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Int’l Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Phila. Marine
Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967))).
75. See Schmidt, 414 U.S. at 473-76, vacating Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
76. See Additive Controls & Measurement Sys. Inc. v. Flowdata Inc., 986 F.2d
476, 479-80 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing NLRB v. Express Publ’g Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-
36 (1941)); John Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) than “Off Switches”: Patent-
Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1422-23 (2012) (suggesting
that specific terms means specific products/services or “colorable imitations”
thereof).
77. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1201 (11th Cir.
1999) (injunction against city “discriminating on the basis of race in its [municipal
boundary] annexation decisions”); Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897
(5th Cir. 1978) (injunction against  “discriminating on the basis of color, race, or
sex in employment practices or conditions of employment . . .”). Compare In re
Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 366-69 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming certification of injunc-
tive relief class where defendant had a policy that could be illegal under chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code, because “injunctions that order a defendant to obey a
specific law” may be appropriate if they “simultaneously indicate what law the de-
fendant needs to obey” under Rule 65(d)), with Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr.
Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (injunction ordering defendant not to en-
gage in this discriminatory practice in future “provided the specificity necessary to
comply with Rule 65(d)” because it was focused on constructively discharging
workers who became pregnant rather than giving them option of light or limited
work that other workers experiencing temporary conditions enjoyed (citing Int’l
Longshoremen’s Assoc., 389 U.S. at 76))).
20
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quately described in terms of the case’s context.78  This has been called
the “‘sufficiently specific to the underlying action’ standard.”79
Writing on both IP and non-IP cases, Lemley and Volokh argued—
despite some law on the other side—that any prior restraint on speech,
including a preliminary or permanent injunction, should be tailored to
the remedial purpose.80  Injunctions against search engines and multina-
tional publications may be likely to sweep in lawful conduct in a way that
does not pass muster under eBay.81  When injunctions extend to in-
termediaries like Google or software providers, the plaintiff may obtain
undue bargaining leverage by threatening lawful domestic aspects of the
intermediaries’ services and banning conduct that is lawful overseas, while
imposing costs on the intermediaries and the public that outweigh the
78. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1137 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (holding, in racketeering case, that Rule 65(d) requires identification of
specific statutory violation, and factual “descriptor[s] of the forbidden conduct,”
with adequately defined terms, which may be made clear by “the circumstances of
the case”); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000)
(in breach of contract/privilege case, injunction against defendant disclosing
plaintiff’s confidential or privileged information did not adequately specify which
information could not be disclosed); Thomas v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504,
506, 509 (9th Cir. 1992) (in constitutional use of police force case, injunction re-
quiring the sheriff’s department to obey its own policies and guidelines to prevent
excessive force or unreasonable searches was not specific enough); FEC v. Fur-
gatch, 869 F.2d 1256, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 1989) (in elections law case, defendant
could not be ordered to obey the law, or not to commit to “similar violations”
unless district court first defined what was similar); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Brock, 778
F.2d 834, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (in labor case, injunction against “substantially simi-
lar” conduct vacated because “similar” not defined by district court); Common
Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 674 F.2d 921, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (simi-
lar to Gulf Oil, in environmental/nuclear regulatory case); SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d
1225, 1233-34 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005) (securities case); see also GoTo.com, Inc. v.
Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he party enjoined
should ‘receive fair and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction actually pro-
hibits . . . .’” (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto
Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974))); cf. Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1210-12, 1222-23 (11th Cir.
2000) (injunction not to inadequately reimburse intermediate care facilities under
Medicaid).
79. Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579,
586 (5th Cir. 2013).
80. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 41, at 210, 244 nn.272, 332; see also id. at
209, 224-25 nn.271, 333-35 (noting case law suggesting that limits on prior re-
straints may not apply to copyright or trademark injunctions, or to commercial
speech more broadly/narrowly).
81. Mark Lemley & Phil Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Informa-
tion?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 785-87, 793-96, 799, 800-04 (2007) (citing Perfect 10 v.
Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).
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remedy’s benefits.82  Courts may tailor such relief to balance the interests
of the parties and members of the public, and limit collateral damage.83
In the trademark context, Stacey Dogan and Mark McKenna have al-
ready written of the need to enjoin the precise conduct found to be unlaw-
ful and use discretion to tailor injunctive relief narrowly.84  For example,
injunctions could be tailored geographically,85 limited to a disclaimer of
affiliation or sponsorship,86 or aimed at the small percentage of consum-
82. See id. at 800-04 (noting that a search engine may automatically copy and
link to a plaintiff’s works that it did not upload or decide to feature, and there may
be no practical way of filtering them out without affecting lawful links/copies that
website owners and Google users desire to have included in the index, and that
peer-to-peer file-sharing software could be enjoined under U.S. law and forced to
shut down even though it was legal in foreign countries such as the Netherlands
(citing HR 19 december 2003, NJ 186 m.nt., (ann. JMH) (Buma/KaZaA) (Neth.)
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands))).
83. Lemley and Weiser point out that in the Google Images case, the court
did not enjoin all infringement by Google of the plaintiff’s images, but prelimina-
rily enjoined it from failing to take down certain links or files brought to its atten-
tion by the plaintiff in a consultative process. See id. at 801-04 (citing Perfect 10 v.
Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484AHM (C.D. Cal. preliminary injunction entered May
8, 2006)).  In a file-sharing case, a judge in the same district where the Google
Images case was decided declined to enjoin all infringement via the defendants’
software, and did not insist that the defendant cease distributing the software
(which defendants had induced members of the public to use to infringe plaintiffs’
copyrights); the defendants were ordered to filter out the availability of the plain-
tiffs’ works, presumably in the United States although given the software’s capabili-
ties it probably was not possible to preserve foreign availability. See Grokster, Ltd.,
454 F. Supp. 2d at 983-84, 989-92; Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., No. CV 01-8541-SVW, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2007)); Lemley &
Weiser, supra note 81, at 801-04; David O. Blood & Kee-Min Ngiam, A Focus on
Filters: Latest Developments in MGM v. Grokster, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J. 2
(2007).  The court ultimately ordered the defendant to utilize available technolo-
gies that promised to be maximally effective to curtail infringement on the file-
sharing system created by the software and its users, while not barring noninfring-
ing uses if they could practically coexist with the implementation of filtering or
other tools. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp.
2d 1197, 1241 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
84. See Stacey Dogan, Trademark Remedies and Online Intermediaries, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 467, 486-89 (2010); Mark McKenna, Back to the Future: Rediscovering
Equitable Discretion in Trademark Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 537, 537-45 (2010).
85. McKenna, supra note 84, at 547-48 (citing Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare
Commc’n, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 737 (8th
Cir. 2001) (order limited to six counties in Arkansas)).
86. See id. at 546 (citing Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F.
Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977) (disclaimer of association or authorization ordered, but
use could continue); see also Am. Soc. for Testing & Materials v. Pub-
lic.Resource.Org, Inc. 896 F.3d 437, 46-58 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (disclaimer might cure
digital confusion); LFP IP, LLC v. Hustler Cincinnati, Inc., 810 F.3d 424, 425-26
(6th Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s order allowing defendant to use allegedly
confusing trademarks unless accompanied by other words in store signage or by
conspicuous disclaimer of affiliation with plaintiff in other areas). But see CFE Rac-
ing Prods., Inc. v. BMF Wheels, Inc., 793 F.3d 571, 596 (6th Cir. 2015) (disclaimer
proposed would not be sufficient to avoid injunction unless it could be shown to
be effective (citing, inter alia, Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Luigino’s, Inc., 423
F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2005))).
22
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ers who evidence confusion in surveys.87  Several Supreme Court cases and
numerous circuit cases recognize this possibility of narrow relief in some
way.88
In the patent context, John Golden suggests broad “safe haven”
alongside a wide enough injunctive scope to reach the specific features
that the court construed to infringe, as well as perhaps “colorable differ-
ences,” or minor variations.89  In appropriate circumstances, courts could
order corrective measures to restore a plaintiff’s rights or to identify prac-
tices from which a defendant should desist to protect those rights.90  He
argued that “obey the law” injunctions are contrary to Federal Circuit pre-
cedent, because the first decision on the topic held that enjoining any
infringement of a patent was too broad and improperly tethered to poten-
tially undefined terms in another document, even though later decisions
revealed a split among panels on the propriety of such orders.91  He also
notes the judicial practice of phasing in orders to give infringers time to
adapt.92
87. See McKenna, supra note 84, at 112-13 (citing Grotrian, Helfferich Schulz,
Etc. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (involving only 8.5%
confusion) rev’d on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that confu-
sion was sufficient for likelihood of success on injunction motion), rev’g Coca-Cola
Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (S.D.N.Y.) (7.5% confusion,
“significantly below 15%”); James Burroughs Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540
F.2d 266, 279 (7th Cir. 1976) (15% confusion “evidences a likelihood of confu-
sion.”); Goya Foods, Inc. v. Condal Distribs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 453, 457-58 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (9-10% confusion may be “meaningful evidence of actual confu-
sion” so court “conclude[d] that an appreciable number of ordinary consumers
are likely to be confused as to the source of the . . . rice packages”); see also Daniel
Gervais & Julie M. Latsko, Who Cares about the 85 Percent-Reconsidering Survey Evidence
of Online Confusion in Trademark Cases, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 265
(2014).
88. See supra notes 29, 42, 46, 70, 74-75, 78 and accompanying text (citing Fort
Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 108 (1983); Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 471 (1974); Granny Goose Foods
v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974)); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); NLRB v. Express Publ’g Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-
36 (1941)).
89. See Golden, supra note 76 at 1452-56, 1462, 1472.
90. See id. at 1472.
91. See id. at 1420-25 (citing, inter alia, Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic
Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining district court permissi-
bly enjoined “otherwise infringing” plaintiff’s claims); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax
Pharm., Inc., 501 F.3d 1263, 1271-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (district court should not
have enjoined “any products that infringe”); Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,
383 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (district court should not enjoin  “‘any de-
vice’ . . . [of defendant] that is within the scope of the patent claims”); Signtech
USA, Ltd. v. Vutek, Inc., 174 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that injunc-
tion against “any further infringement” was error, albeit harmless due to trial and
order records)).
92. See id. at 1461 nn.261-62 (collecting cases).
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Drafting an injunction often calls for balancing the movants’ interest
in complete relief that eradicates all illegality and its effects and the non-
movants’ interests in reasonable detail and due process especially for non-
parties.  First, the non-party has not had a chance to be served with the
complaint, contest the allegations, provide context and discovery, and
fully brief the violation being enjoined.93  This threatens the notice func-
tion of Rule 65(d) relating to punishment for contempt, and the specific-
ity function relating to simplifying or avoiding contempt motion
practice.94
Second, some courts have rightly questioned whether there is any au-
thority for binding to an injunction a third party that is not controlling (or
under the control of) an infringer, or for ordering the third party to hand
over a domain name or content, for example.95  Even successors or assigns
of a party may not be bound by a judgment, so why should non-parties
who are not co-conspirators etc. be so bound?96  Rule 65’s reach to those
in active concert or participation requires more than an arm’s length
transaction such as those with cybersecurity, domain name, search engine
listing, or cloud storage providers.97  Independent action at arm’s length
93. See Zepeda v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 753 F.2d 719, 727
(9th Cir. 1984) (non-parties/their rights “not before the court”).
94. See Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., 512 F.3d 412, 415 (7th
Cir. 2008).
95. See, e.g., Overstock.com, Inc. v. Visocky, No. 1:17-cv-01331(LMB/TCB),
2018 WL 5046673, at *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2018) (declining to issue injunction
against domain names as alter egos of named defendants); True Mfg. Co. v. Boys,
No. 6:16-cv-634, 2016 WL 11028258, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2016) (declining to
order Amazon.com or GoDaddy to “cancel, park, deactivate, and suspend” domain
name and Amazon store front page, despite finding domain name was used for
cybersquatting, trademark infringement, and false designation of origin/unfair
competition); Wilens v. Doe Def. No. 1, No.14-cv-02419-LB, 2015 WL 5121379, at
*2  (N.D. Cal. partially granting request to modify default judgment Aug. 28, 2015)
(court could not order transfer of other websites containing plaintiff’s trademarks
despite default judgment against defendant for cybersquatting and perhaps defa-
mation, because other domains using marks might not be used for actionable con-
duct); cf. Vizer v. Vizernews.com, 869 F. Supp. 2d 75, 84 (D.D.C. 2012) (court
lacked jurisdiction to order Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers to assign domain name to plaintiff on grounds it contained plaintiff’s name
and displayed website containing plaintiff’s photograph and news about plaintiff,
on cybersquatting theory). But see infra note 15 and supra note 101.  The court has
the authority under 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) to order the destruction of infringing prod-
ucts, and the authority to enjoin infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 502, but a do-
main name itself does not infringe.
96. See Season’s Pizza Franchisor, Inc. v. 4 Seasons Pizza & Subs, No. WDQ.
15-739, 2015 WL 9304539, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2015) (declining to bind succes-
sors or assigns where their roles had not been fully aired, noting: “Action as an
alter ego, or in collusion, is required to find concert or participation under [R]ule
65(d)” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d
474, 478 (4th Cir. 1963))).
97. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(A)-(C) (injunction generally “binds
only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise:
[ ] the parties; [ ] the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys;
and [ ] other persons who are in active concert or participation with [the afore-
24
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does not satisfy the joint participation or action requirement of Rule
65(d).98
Third, the balance of hardships may swing towards denial of injunc-
tion against non-parties where an order for the direct infringer to comply
with the law makes it unnecessary and disproportionately costly to order
third parties to act.99  This may be particularly true when the injunction
may have effects in other federal judicial circuits.100
Fourth, transferring domain names is not a copyright remedy.101  Dy-
namically blocking sites’ access to CDNs or search engines adds remedies
mentioned persons”).  The principles of interpretation ejusdem generis and noscitur
a sociis would suggest that others “in active concert or participation” should be like
servants or agents, which arm’s length service providers might not be. Id.; see
Norwolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1999) (ejusdem
generis); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (noscitur a sociis); Neal v.
Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878) (both ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis); see also
Lynott v. Luckovich, No. C14-503RSL, 2015 WL 135882 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24,
2015) (utilizing this principle to interpret a federal rule).  There is no fiduciary
duty—a principle linked to an agency—in some service provider/customer rela-
tionships, like some film distributor/film owner relationships. See Song Fi, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., No. C 14-5080 CW, 2016 WL 1298999, at *7-9, *8 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
4, 2016) (citing Recorded Picture Co. v. Nelson Entm’t, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 4th 350,
370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).  An agent is often a fiduciary. See Nelson Entm’t, Inc., 53
Cal. App. 4th at 369-70.
98. See Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
99. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (injunction should go
only so far as relief needed by plaintiff); California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558 582-85
(9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2018) (same); Va. Soc. for Human Life v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 392-
94 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); cf. Thompson v. Sessions, No. 16-3 (RDM), 2018 WL
4680201, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (where plaintiff is not threatened with
continuing injury from defendant’s conduct, there would be no basis for court to
enjoin defendant from harming the rights of other injured potential plaintiffs).
100. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984); Azar, 911 F.3d at
582-85; Va. Soc. for Human Life, 263 F.3d at 393-94.
101. See infra note 103 (citing Netcom); Overstock.com, Inc. v. Visocky, No.
1:17-cv-01331 (LMB/TCB), 2018 WL 5046673, at *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2018) (on
default judgment in copyright and trademark case involving e-commerce clone
phishing sites, court could order persons not to use domain names to host infring-
ing material, but could not issue order against domain name as entity);
Righthaven, LLC v. DiBiase, No. 2:10-cv-01343-RLH, 2011 WL 1458778, at *2 (D.
Nev. Apr. 15, 2011) (declining to transfer domain name used to infringe plaintiff’s
copyright as issue for Congress (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984))). But see McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, L.L.C.
v. Khan, 323 F. Supp. 3d 488, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[A] number of courts have
found that a transfer of domain names is an appropriate remedy to prevent further
infringement of a copyright holder’s rights.” (emphasis added)); Paramount Pic-
tures Corp. v. Does, No. 15-CV-5819, 2015 WL 10013786, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24,
2015) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) and inherent equitable powers to enjoin those
other than defendants/their employees who were in active concert or participa-
tion with them, including domain name registries and/or registrars listing the do-
main names to transfer names to plaintiffs); Elsevier, Inc. v. Han, No. 1:16-CV1245-
RA, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016) (on default judgment, entering permanent
injunction including mandate that domain name registries transfer domain names
to plaintiffs); cf. Cengage Learning,. Inc. v. Shi, No. 13 Civ. 7772 (VSB), 2017 WL
1063463, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017); BWP Media USA Inc. v. NV Media Grp.,
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onto the Copyright Act (and sometimes to the Lanham Act) that Congress
did not provide.102  This additional remedy also threatens the freedom of
speech by causing Internet posts to be prescreened and possibly filtered,
leading to disproportionately broad relief.103
In general, injunctions should not issue against cloud technologies or
other ISPs unless applicable liability standards are met.  Like IP’s secon-
dary liability standards, Rule 65(d) requires “alter ego, collusion, or iden-
tity of interest.”104  Substantive law is impermissibly changed by allowing a
plaintiff to enjoin a cloud service without fulfilling the traditional require-
ments of a joint enterprise, pierced corporate veil, or indirect liability stan-
dards such as solicitation or control of the direct infringer’s actions,
disregard of corporate separateness that would operate as a fraud, knowl-
edge of specific infringing acts and continued facilitation thereof, direct
profit from the infringement with the ability to control the specific form
the infringement takes, or active encouragement or advertising designed
Inc., No. 13-CV-8866 (DAB), 2015 WL 2152679, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2015);
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Tyrrell-Miller, 678 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
102. In passing the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Congress
created a remedy of transfer or cancellation of a domain name registered by some-
one that is cybersquatting a famous and registered trademark, but did not do this
for other trademark violations or for copyright violations. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) (2018); Am. Online v. Aol.Org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 (E.D.
Va. 2003).  The use of differing language by Congress should have some effect on
remedial options. See Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2071 (2018)
(“We usually ‘presume differences in [statutory] language [across different acts of
Congress] convey differences in meaning.’” (quoting Henson v. Santander Con-
sumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1723 (2017))); cf. Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-
sion.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United Stated v. Wong Kim Bo,
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))).  Congress knows how to draft specific reme-
dies against things.  See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.Com, 51 F. Supp. 2d
707, 712 (E.D. Va. 1999), vacated and remanded, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002).
103. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1382-83 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting, where plaintiff sought injunctive
relief against Internet service providers of defendant who had already been en-
joined from infringing its works, that they “play a vital role in the speech of their
users.  Requiring them to prescreen postings for possible infringement would chill
their users’ speech”).
104. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co., 84 F.3d 372, 377 (10th Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Appellant’s Append. II at 674, 676,
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co., 84 F.3d 372 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-4054));
see also In re Skyport Glob. Commc’ns, Inc., 661 F. App’x 835, 843 (5th Cir. 2016);
NBA Props., Inc. v. Gold, 895 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1990).  Identity of interest has
been called privity. See Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of Baha’is of U.S. Under Heredi-
tary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of Baha’is of U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d
837, 849 (7th Cir. 2010); Barrow v. Shearing, No. 3:14-CV-800-NJR-DGW, 2017 WL
3866818 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2017).
26
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to increase the amount of infringement.105  Like IP’s direct liability stan-
dards, Rule 65(c) requires specificity about which actions are illegal.106
105. See Astornet Techs. Inc. v. BAE Sys., Inc., 802 F.3d 1271, 1278-80 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (either veil-piercing or some form of conduct justifying imposition of
indirect liability for infringement is required to hold parent corporation liable for
sales by its subsidiary); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d
1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (for joint patent infringement, party that
does not carry out all infringing elements must be either vicariously liable or liable
for purposefully agreeing with, soliciting, or contracting with an agent or contrac-
tor to commit infringing acts as joint enterprise); Columbia Pictures Indus. v.
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1034-39 (9th Cir. 2013) (something more than provision of a
neutral service at arm’s length, such as active encouragement or advertising that
causes more infringement, is required for inducement liability); UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (some-
thing more than ability to terminate the account is required to hold service pro-
vider liable for vicarious liability in copyright); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (knowledge or willful blindness as to infringing acts
is required for contributory liability on part of service provider); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 730-31 (ability to control continuation of in-
fringement on original website, and not merely contents of search index or graph,
is required for imposition of vicarious liability on search engine); Ellison v. Robert-
son, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2004) (infringement must cause additional
financial benefit to defendant for vicarious liability, a general financial benefit ac-
cruing to defendant from its customers’ activity being insufficient); A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-23 (9th Cir. 2001) (similar to
Viacom on knowledge and to Ellison on benefit); Joint Stock Co. “Channel One
Russ. Worldwide” v. Russian TV Co., No. 18 Civ. 2318(LGS), 2019 WL 804506, at
*2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019) (refusing to hold affiliated business liable for defen-
dant’s conduct simply because it advertised main defendant’s streaming service,
shared offices and executives with it, and was lumped together with it in com-
plaint); Johnson v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., No. C17-541 RSM, 2017
WL 3313963, at *5-7 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 3, 2017) (refusing to hold corporate par-
ents of motion picture studio liable for infringing James Bond box set without
allegation of their distinct roles); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F.
Supp. 2d 724, 749-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (service that allowed consumers to upload
and share photos would not be liable for infringing photos under vicarious theory
because it did not control original infringement, although it did control the stor-
age and sharing features of its service); cf. Fujitsu, Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d
1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (contributory patent infringement). But see Cricket
Wireless L.L.C. v. Maz Wireless, LLC, No. 18-CV-13375-13375-SRC-CLW (D.N.J.
Mar. 5, 2019) (lumping together parents, affiliates, and subsidiaries in same in-
junction against defendant LLC); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. PMD Technologie UG,
No. 2:16-cv-07210-AB-E (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2017) (lumping together parents and
subsidiaries of defendant in copyright injunction against it); Poke´mon Co. Int’l,
Inc. v. Sahagian, No. 2:15-cv-00866 TSZ (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 2015) (lumping to-
gether parents and subsidiaries on both sides as parties to copyright injunction); IP
Power Holdings Limited, LTD. v. Bam Brokerage, No. SACV 11-1234 JVS (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 9, 2014) (lumping together parents and subsidiaries of defendant into
patent infringement injunction); Wincan Am., Inc. v. Envirosight, LLC, No.
3:09CV-103-S, 2011 WL 3042561, at *1 (W.D. Ky. July 25, 2011) (describing “parent
corporations, subsidiaries, and all persons in active concert or participation with it
or any of them” as part of “usual litany” of targets of trademark infringement in-
junction) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see also supra note 15 and infra
note 226.
106. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c); cf. Venegas-Hernandez v. Asociacion De Com-
positores, Editores De Musica Latinoamericana, 424 F.3d 50, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2005)
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While the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the All Writs
Act, and inherent equitable powers are cited in favor of broader injunc-
tions than might be justified under the IP laws and Rule 65 themselves,
these powers are also limited.107  Specifically, the All Writs Act does not
make other laws moot, and the DMCA injunction provision does not cre-
ate copyright liability where none existed, or require a defendant to
search for and remove infringements itself.108
Some courts have used a much less restrictive and extraordinary mea-
sure than enjoining a neutral third party from doing something that in-
creases the infringement in some way.  They have ordered, for example,
the defendant to request that its own content or advertising campaigns get
removed from a search engine such as Bing or Google.109  This is similar
(a “listed infringing act” is required for copyright liability under 17 U.S.C. § 106);
Best v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-564, 2015 WL 1125539, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 10, 2015) (plaintiff must plead facts triggering a specific prong of Lanham
Act to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim); Atlantic Recording Corp. v.
Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (D. Az. 2008) (Copyright Act “plainly requires”
specific forms of conduct for direct liability (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (D. Mass.
2008))).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A)(i) (2018) (rightsholder may obtain injunction
restraining ISP “from providing access to infringing material”); id.
§ 512(j)(1)(A)(ii) (injunction prohibiting ISP “from providing access to a sub-
scriber or account holder . . . who is engaging in infringing activity . . . by terminat-
ing the accounts of the subscriber or account holder”); id. § 512(j)(1)(A)(iii)
(allowing other injunctions that are not burdensome and “prevent or restrain in-
fringement of copyrighted material specified in the order of the court at a particu-
lar online location”); Not in My Backyard: Blocking Infringement at the Real and Virtual
Border, ABA, SECTION OF IP LAW ANNUAL MEETING CONCURRENT PROGRAM (Mar. 31,
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellec-
tual_property_law/new-notinmybackyard-availabil-v22.pdf [https://perma.cc/
583M-3LAN].
108. See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Pa.
Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 40 (1985) (All Writs Act));
Mon Cheri Bridals, LLC v. P’ships, No. 3:15-cv-00021-FDW-DCK, 2015 WL
3509259, at *8 (W.D.N.C. June 4, 2015) (All Writs Act); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging
Network, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 4135(RWS), 2011 WL 940056, at  *1-8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17,
2011) (proposed injunction requiring party defendant to search for and prevent
or restrain infringements was not permissible under DMCA, 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(j)(1)(A)(iii)); H.R. REP. No. 105-796, at 75-76 (1998) (Conf. Rep.),  https://
www.congress.gov/105/crpt/hrpt796/CRPT-105hrpt796.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4EPH-7UWB] (512 does not create new liability); Annemarie Bridy, Three Notice
Failures in Copyright Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 777, 829 (2016) (512(j) assumes ISP has
shown eligibility for safe harbor of 512(a)-(d), which presumes filing an answer
and making a motion or filing a brief, and requires notice); cf. In re Life Inv’rs Ins.
Co. of Am., 589 F.3d 319, 330 (6th Cir. 2009) (substantive statutes limit seemingly
broad power under All Writs Act).
109. See, e.g., Real Spirit USA, Inc. v. Waterionizerscams, No. 3:16-CV-00322,
slip op. (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2017) (ordering the parties to request that Bing, Google,
and Yahoo! remove a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) from their indexes); Selee
Corp. v. McDanel Advanced Ceramic Techs., LLC, Civil Case No. 1:15-cv-00129-
MR, slip op. (W.D.N.C. Nov. 23, 2016) (order required “the sending of a registered
letter (with a copy to Plaintiff) to all internet search engines, including but not
28
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to instances in which courts required defendants who created a false im-
pression to contact consumers through television or in record stores to fix
it.110  By contrast, ordering a non-conspiratorial search engine or CDN to
prevent the infringement would be like issuing an order to the television
or record player manufacturer to correct the misimpression left by an
over-the-air advertisement or faulty album cover.
III. AIMING FOR PRECISION ABOUT INJURY IN COMPLEX CASES
A. Injury as Liability
Before eBay, the presumption of irreparable injury from the main
forms of IP infringement was a formal presumption.111  This has purport-
edly been abandoned as in direct conflict with the holding of eBay.112
After eBay, however, a new version of the presumption crops up.  It
arises when courts treat facts central to a likelihood of success on copy-
limited to, Google, Bing, and Yahoo!, requesting that (i) any and all of Defen-
dant’s keyword advertising and sponsored advertisements containing the terms
[etc.] be removed or replaced with a non-infringing alternative”); Nat’l Grange of
the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Ca. State Grange, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1065,
1081-82 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (where defendant’s address and telephone number came
up on Google Maps in response to searches for “California State Grange,” ordering
“defendant to remove the word ‘Grange’ from all public telephone and business
directory listings, on the internet and otherwise, to the extent it can do so”); Diaz
v. Bautista, No.2:10-cv-04690-MFW (JCx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012) (“Prada
shall upload and/or transmit, or cause to be uploaded and/or transmitted, to
www.google.com, www.bing.com and any other search engine websites a copy of
this injunction along with instructions informing Google, Bing, and any other
search engine operators that for any search [including certain terms, certain sites
should not be shown].”); cf. Google Inc. v. Local Lighthouse Corp., No. 4: 15-cv-
04219, slip op. ¶ 12 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (ordering defendant to serve copy of
injunction on all “contractors who are conducting marketing activities on behalf of
Defendant”).
110. See, e.g., Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642,
650-51 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court’s order of corrective advertising,
presumably on television where part of misleading advertising aired), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 916 (1982) (citing, inter alia, CBS, Inc. v. Gusto Records, Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 447 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), in which court ordered a decal designed to cure
confusion to be affixed to an album); see also Selee Corp., 2017 WL 3122565 (order-
ing defendant to place corrective advertising on its website); cf. Gilliam v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 14-15, 19 (2d Cir. 1976) (although Second Circuit or-
dered a simpler prohibitory injunction to be issued, district court ordered televi-
sion station to disclose that comedy actors, writers and producers did not want to
be affiliated with edited version of television show they had produced and licensed
on certain conditions to defendant).
111. See In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 536 (4th Cir.
2003), abrogated in part as stated in Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entm’t
Corp., 452 F. App’x 351 (4th Cir. 2011), and in Volvo Group North America, LLC
v. Truck Enterprises, Inc., 2018 WL 4704047, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2018);
Bourne Co. v. Tower Records, Inc., 976 F.2d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated as
stated in Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2010); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated in part as
stated in VidAngel, 869 F.3d 848.
112. See infra note 111.
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right or trademark merits questions—notably facts associated with the loss
of control of a copyright or trademark—as leading to an injunction.113
There are also some cases formally presuming irreparable injury—al-
though not an injunction itself—when a copyright is infringed.114  It may
be meaningful that the copyright statute, unlike the Patent Act and the
Lanham Act, does not subject the court’s power to restrain infringement
upon such terms as it may deem reasonable to “principles of equity.”115
The Copyright Act used to refer explicitly to equity in reference to injunc-
tions, but it no longer refers to equity, incorporating a standard of “rea-
sonable” prevention or restraint of infringement instead.116  Does this
mean that the requirement of irreparable injury went away?  Courts have
so far resisted formalizing this conclusion, but their practice suggests some
sympathy with it.
Copyright cases are departing greatly from the trends in patent law to
rigorously police the irreparable injury requirement and apply it harshly
against NPEs.  For example, in Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.,117
the plaintiff movie studios alleged copyright infringement and circumven-
tion of copyright protection measures and sought a preliminary injunction
against a service that basically censored and rented out Blu-ray discs and
DVDs by copying them and streaming filtered versions.118  The defendant
pointed out that the plaintiffs delayed suing for about a year and actively
licensed their works to multiple third parties including Apple iTunes,
Google Play, HBO, Hulu, and Netflix, none of which had complained
about the defendant’s filtered rentals.119  Except for the longer delay and
perhaps greater notice of potential infringement, the situation therefore
resembled eBay, in which eBay argued that because the plaintiff was willing
to license out its patents, it lacked irreparable harm from infringement.120
Remarkably, the Ninth Circuit concluded that irreparable harm existed
113. See infra notes 118-121, 138-143, 159-160, 162 and accompanying text.
114. See Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Zahn, No. 3:06-0212, 2007 WL 542816, at *4 (M.D.
Tenn. Feb. 16, 2007)); Sony BMG Music Entm’t. v. Tenenbaum, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d
1867, 1868 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Blake, No. 5:06-CV-
00120-BR, 2007 WL 1853956, at *6-7 (E.D.N.C. Jun. 26, 2007); Andrew Spillane,
The Continuing Vitality of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Copyright Cases, 15
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 257, 259, 281-83 (2011); cf. Christopher Phelps &
Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 544 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Irreparable injury
often derives from the nature of copyright violations, which deprive the copyright
holder of intangible exclusive rights.” (emphasis added)).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2018).  Compare Herb Reed Enters. v. Fla. Entm’t
Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a); 35 U.S.C.
§ 283).
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2018); Go´mez-Arostegui, supra note 19, at 1682-
83.
117. 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017).
118. See id. at 848-57 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)).
119. See id. at 865-66.
120. See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), rev’d, 547 U.S. 388.
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because the defendant’s infringement threatened the plaintiff’s “negotiat-
ing position,” even though it has cited the desire to use untrammeled IP
rights to negotiate a larger licensing fee from third party licensees as inad-
equate evidence of irreparable harm post-eBay.121
The Ninth Circuit in VidAngel also adopted a relaxed approach to the
requirement that the irreparable harm be caused by the party to be en-
joined rather than other infringers or factors.  In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., it held that a subscription-based content provider had not shown ir-
reparable harm under eBay where it had shown that it was suffering from
infringement and “threatened . . . with financial ruin,” but it could not tie
this “ruin” to the defendant’s acts as opposed to other search engines or
websites.122  Like the plaintiffs in VidAngel, Perfect 10 had no evidence
that any specific licensee had terminated an agreement because of the
defendant’s infringement.123
The bare “loss of control” associated with invasion of the right to ex-
clude others from using IP, found inadequate in eBay, is proving to be
critical in copyright injunction decisions.  In VidAngel, the Ninth Circuit
surveyed the law in this area, which recognized that a loss of control over
goodwill and business reputation could be difficult to repair and that un-
authorized streaming in particular could damage business models based
on different windows for video content, at a relatively high price in the
movie theater, followed by the on-demand sale period, the on-demand
rental-only period, and finally sale and rental of physical copies, pay-per-
view and premium cable transmission, and over-the-air broadcast and sub-
scription streaming.  Streaming illegally is “likely” to harm this model and
associated “goodwill” and “leverage” because some licensees may observe
or mention the unauthorized streams in offering less money for licenses,
or none at all.124  However, this proposition does not have the support of
a cited case arising out of a situation in which the plaintiff was losing out
due to illegal streams, let alone due directly to the defendants’ own
streams.125  In cases of streaming apps for connected televisions or other
devices, it has been said: “Unauthorized and uncompensated internet
streaming that competes directly with the television programming of a
copyright owner and its authorized licensees causes harm that is ‘neither
121. VidAngel, 869 F.3d at 865 (quoting district court) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Compare id., with Fox Broad. Co., v. Dish Network LLC, 583 F.
App’x 618 (9th Cir. 2014).
122. 653 F.3d 976, 978-79, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Christina Bohannan,
Copyright Harm and Injunctions, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 17-20 (2012).
123. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976 981-82 (9th Cir. 2011).
124. VidAngel, 869 F.3d at 866.
125. See id. (citing Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736
F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d
Cir. 2012); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50
(D.D.C. 2013)).
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easily calculable, nor easily compensable.’”126  Similarly, in American Society
for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,127 the plaintiffs alleged
that their standards for public safety, training, testing, and the like, which
had been incorporated into federal regulations by reference, had been
posted to the defendant’s legal archive.128  The court enjoined the archive
from infringing the copyright in the standards or the trademarks of the
plaintiff organizations simply because plaintiffs might lose revenue and
reputational benefits and therefore the ability to generate further stan-
dards using those revenues and benefits.129
The indifference of copyright courts to potential legal remedies is
longstanding.  In Rogers v. Koons, the court stood ready pre-eBay to issue an
equitable order requiring the surrender of defendant’s infringing deriva-
tive work alongside a defendant’s profits award in the tens or hundreds of
thousands of dollars, even though the methodology used to calculate the
lost profits remedy could have been employed for future exhibitions
etc.130  The photographer could have been called an NPE under a patent
law framework, insofar as he licensed his photograph to a company that
manufactured postcards from it, but had not licensed it to date to a sculp-
tor like the defendant.131  In Christopher Phelps & Associates v. Galloway,132
the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that the jury’s verdict of $20,000
in damages meant that there was no irreparable injury because the
award—like a fee for services—would compensate plaintiff for the contin-
uing use of its architectural design for the defendant’s house, based pre-
sumably on testimony of the plaintiff that this was how much it would have
charged defendant for the design in dispute.133  This seems to disregard
126. China Cent. Tel. v. Create New Tech. (HK) Ltd., No. 15-01869, 2015 WL
3649187, at *12 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2015) (quoting Fox Tel. Stations, Inc. v. Bar-
ryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2012)) (citing
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Filmon X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 49-51 (D.D.C.
2013)); Warner Bros. Entm’t v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012-13 (C.D.
Cal. 2011); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121,
Civ.A. 00-120, 2000 WL 255989, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000)).
127. No. 13-cv-1215(TSC), 2017 WL 473822 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017), rev’d on
other grounds, 896 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
128. See id. at *1-5.
129. See id. at *24.
130. See Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 480-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), amended by
777 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Paul Edward
Geller, Hiroshige vs. Van Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright Scope in Remedying
Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 39, 69-70 (1998).
131. Roger v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1992); see also FED. TRADE
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8 (2003) (defining NPE to include those who develop and
transfer rights in intellectual property).
132. 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007).
133. See id. at 535-41, 544.  The court did, as explained below, use the concept
of a forced judicial sale to find that the balance of hardships and public interest
did not favor equitable relief.
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the fact that the license would have exhausted the copyright and that ar-
chitects do not typically get paid when houses are resold.134
In patent law, neither intangible harm to the right to exclude nor the
pursuit of bargaining leverage in licensing negotiations is sufficient to
show irreparable injury.135  Similarly, in cases involving trade secrets, the
loss of leverage in forming new business relationships due to misappropri-
ation is not necessarily irreparable injury.136  Despite the uniqueness—
even sacredness—of persons’ privacy and reputation, courts have repeat-
edly held that the destruction thereof is not always an irreparable
injury.137
Courts are short-circuiting analyses in trademark cases by finding ir-
reparable injury and other eBay factors to be present whenever a trade-
mark has been violated.138  This is particularly troublesome in trademark
134. See Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
562, 572-73 (2016).
135. See High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49
F.3d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (willingness to license a patent “is ‘incompatible
with the emphasis on the right to exclude that is the basis for the presumption [of
irreparable injury] in a proper case’” (quoting T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v. Con-
sol. Med. Equip., Inc., 821 F.2d 646, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1987))); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue
Coat Sys., LLC, No. 15-cv-03295, 2016 WL 6873541, at *5-8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22,
2016) (similar); Telcordia Tech., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727, 747-48,
748 n.10 (D. Del. 2009) (indifference of potential licensees to licensing opportuni-
ties due to unavailability of injunction would not be irreparable harm, unlike lost
sales, which would; “Telcordia’s willingness to license its patents also suggests that
its injury is compensable in monetary damages, which is inconsistent with the right
to exclude.” (citing IMX, Inc. v. Lending-Tree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 225 (D.
Del. 2007))); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006)),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 612 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also
PGP, LLC v. TPII, 734 F. App’x 330, 334-35 (6th Cir. 2018) (seeking leverage in
negotiating licensing agreement is not necessarily irreparable injury on part of
trademark owner); Gilson LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 52, at 956 (“Courts in
other contexts have also found lost sales compensable in damages, such as suits to
enforce a non-compete clause or for the theft of trade secrets.”) (collecting cases).
But see Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(patentee may be entitled to seek injunction for purposes of obtaining “competi-
tive leverage” justified by scope of patent).
136. See H&R Block Tax Servs. LLC v. Acevedo-Lopez, 742 F.3d 1074, 1078
(8th Cir. 2014); Capital Tool & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837
F.2d 171, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988); Founder Starcoin, Inc. v. Launch Labs, Inc., No.
18-CV-972, 2018 WL 3343790, at *1-3, *12-14 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2018).
137. See Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017)
(affirming district court order that invasion of cable subscriber’s privacy interest in
viewing records might not be enjoinable, due to adequate remedy at law, although
appellate court emphasized lack of “concrete injury” instead); Ventura v. Kyle, 825
F.3d 876, 878-79, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2016) (suggesting that former governor might
have adequate remedy at law for harm to his reputation in bestselling book and
then-popular cable television show); Kazal v. Price, No. 8:17-cv-2945, 2017 WL
6270086 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2017) (suggesting there might not be irreparable injury
from libels, or at least it was not shown from derogatory nature of them on their
face).
138. See, e.g., Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 627 (5th Cir.
2013); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 377, 382
33
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law because a trademark is not intended to be as much of a property right,
in federal statutory terms, as a copyright or patent, and because trademark
liability may be found when most consumers—and the reasonable shop-
per—are not and would not be confused or led astray by the defendant’s
use.139  An injunction is extraordinary relief that requires a strong case,
according to recent authority.140  Irreparable injury is often harm that is
(6th Cir. 2006); Crossfit, Inc. v. Quinnie, 232 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1316-17 (N.D. Ga.
2017); Jones v. Am. Council on Exercise, 245 F. Supp. 3d 853, 867 (S.D. Tex.
2017); Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Zeal, LLC, 135 F. Supp. 3d 451, 470-71 (D.S.C.
2015); Am. Bridal & Prom Indus. Ass’n v. Affordablebridaldresses.com, No. 3:14-
cv-2311 (AET), slip op. (D.N.J. June 3, 2015); Reynolds Consumer Prods., Inc. v.
Handi-Foil Corp., 1:13-CV-214, 2014 WL 3615853, at *12 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2014)
(citing examples), appeal dismissed (Dec. 19, 2014)); Diamonds Direct USA, Inc. v.
BFJ Holdings, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 2d 752, 761-63 (E.D. Va. 2012); Tiramisu Int’l
LLC v. Clever Imps. LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (citing, inter
alia, N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227 (11th Cir.
2008)); Gilson LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 52, at 929 (“Even a decade after eBay,
the lower courts—in fact most of them—are still relying on the presumption of
irreparable harm in trademark cases.” (emphasis in original)); see id. at 929-30.
Although an assumption of irreparable harm was not made in Herb Reed Enterprises,
that was because the district court made no findings and cited no evidence as to
harm whatsoever, citing mere “platitudes.”  736 F.3d at 1249-50; see also Gilson La-
Londe & Gilson, supra note 52 at 924 (presumption of irreparable harm is dying in
trademark cases due to decisions like Herb Reed Enterprises, Ferring Pharm., Inc. v.
Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2014), and Commodores
Entm’t Corp. v. McClary, 648 F. App’x 771 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)).
139. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34
(2003) (“Federal trademark law . . . by preventing competitors from copying ‘a
source-identifying mark,’ ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of . . . making purchasing
decisions,’ and ‘helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor)
will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable prod-
uct . . . .’”  (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)); 6 THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION 32:185 (5th ed.); see also Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (one of two rationales for federal trademark in-
fringement suits is “protect the public from deceit,” while the other is only partially
property-related, to protect “investment from its misappropriation by pirates and
cheats” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3
(1946))); Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1149 (2004) (trademark law was
initially focused on consumer protection, not property rights, and even addition of
anti-dilution protection to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) did not provide “the absolute, ‘in
gross,’ and formal” property right against trademark blurring that some litigants
seek); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringe-
ment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1582-86 (2006) (most courts do not have survey evi-
dence suggesting that most consumers are confused, in cases in which preliminary
injunction against trademark infringement is sought).  See generally Michael Pulos,
A Semiotic Solution to the Propertization Problem of Trademark, 53 UCLA L. REV. 833,
839 (2006).
140. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)
(“[I]njunctive relief [is] an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon
a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” (citing Mazurek v. Arm-
strong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997))); Adidas Am., Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc., 890
F.3d 747, 760-61 (9th Cir. 2018) (plaintiff’s theory of loss of control of reputation
for quality or premium price point due to post-sale confusion with defendant’s
34
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uncertain in extent or intolerable from the standpoint of the legal sys-
tem.141  To presume irreparable harm from a loss of goodwill, which may
occur in any trademark case, is to eviscerate this important factor.142  If
the loss to goodwill is unquantifiable, it may very well be speculative.143
If, on the other hand, a loss to goodwill is quantifiable, it may be
adequately remedied by monetary relief.144  The goodwill value of a pat-
products required evidence that consumers did or would associate low quality or
price point of defendant with plaintiff’s products, which was lacking); Gilson La-
Londe & Gilson, supra note 52, at 941 (where consumers had a positive experience
with alleged infringer of plaintiff’s trademark, injunctive relief was not warranted
(citing Miguel Pure Foods Co. v. Ramar Int’l Corp., 625 F. App’x 322 (9th Cir.
2015))). But see 2Die4Kourt v. Hillair Capital Mgmt., LLC, 692 F. App’x 366, 369
(9th Cir. 2017) (it was enough, at “early” preliminary injunction stage, to argue
that plaintiffs will “likely will lose some measure of control over their business rep-
utation in the absence of injunctive relief”); Gilson LaLonde & Gilson, supra note
52, at 941 (where plaintiff’s trademark was placed at “risk” by defendant, fact that
no poor-quality goods were sold under it did not justify denying injunction (citing
Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2009))).
141. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2010); Bonaparte v. Cam-
den & Amboy R.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (No. 1,617), quoted in 3
JOSEPH STORY & MELVILLE BIGELOW, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 264, n.1 (2000) (remedy of injunction is
withheld unless injury to party seeking it will be irreparable, for it will inflict irrepa-
rable injury on the enjoined party); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 62 (10th ed. 1870) (eq-
uity has its “origin in the fact [sic], that [in some cases] there is either no remedy
at all, or the remedy is imperfect and inadequate”) (collecting sources); id. at 121
(justifying injunctions against copyright and patent infringement by stating that
“extent of the injury” is unknowable); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREP-
ARABLE INJURY RULE 70-71 (1991) (irreparable injury exists because a “dollar value
cannot easily be assigned to a company’s loss of clientele, goodwill, marketing
techniques, office stability, etc.”).
142. Cf. Rent–A–Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc.,
944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991) (loss of goodwill is irreparable as difficult to
measure); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1103 (same);
Gilson LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 52, at 938 (sale of hamburgers by a fine
dining establishment, which was former franchisee of trademark holder, could af-
fect franchisor’s goodwill in ways difficult to measure (citing Benihana, Inc. v.
Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887 (2d Cir. 2015))).
143. See Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 583 F. App’x 618, 619 (9th Cir.
2014) (holding that “the district court did not commit legal error by characterizing
the irreparable harm forecasts of Fox’s executive as speculative”); see also In re
Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Speculative injury
cannot be the basis for a finding of irreparable harm.” (citing Goldie’s Bookstrore,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 446, 472 (9th Cir. 1984))); VHT, Inc. v. Zillow
Grp., Inc., No. C15-1096JLR, 2017 WL 2654583, at *22-24 (W.D. Wash. June 20,
2017) (same).
144. See Fox Broad., 583 F. App’x at 620 (holding that “record also supports
the district court’s conclusion that any concessions Fox makes in contractual nego-
tiations with other distributors that result directly from Dish Network’s contested
technologies may be monetized”); Danone, US, LLC v. Chobani, LLC, No. 18 Civ.
11702 (CM), 2019 WL 760040 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (lost sales due to mislead-
ing labels on dairy products could be estimated in damages phase, so irreparable
injury was questionable); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 4135,
2011 WL 940056, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2011) (although plaintiff’s visual art was
35
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ent or a trademark could be quantified in at least three ways: replacement
cost in terms of the investments required to replicate or regenerate the
competitive advantage produced by the asset, fair market value in terms of
a lump-sum royalty or projected running royalty income, and income valu-
ation in terms of increased profitability for not paying royalties to other
rightsholders or in terms of dividing the income from total business opera-
tions among various assets.145
Trademark counterfeiting is a notable class of cases in which mone-
tary relief may be compensatory or even a windfall.  Congress made availa-
ble statutory damages for counterfeiting ranging up to $200,000 per type
of good or service of the defendant, or $2 million for willful use of a coun-
terfeit mark.146  Unauthorized streaming or competition with a streaming
service, however, would not appear to qualify as counterfeiting unless the
defendant used the trademark of another in the domain name or other
way.147
There are many court orders transferring or cancelling domain name
registrations.148  This would be a little odd if eBay applied, because the
uploaded by unspecified users to defendant’s photo uploading and sharing service
Photobucket, injury was not irreparable because artist had not explained how cop-
yright damages would not compensate her); see also Gilson LaLonde & Gilson,
supra note 52, at 958 (collecting cases).
145. See John Elmore, The Valuation of Trademark-Related Intangible Property, IN-
TANGIBLE PROP. TRANSFER PRICE INSIGHTS, Winter 2015, at 66-79; Robert Reilly, Pres-
entation to the American Institute of CPAs: Practical Applications of Patent Valuation
Approaches and Methods (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.willamette.com/pubs/presenta
tions/reilly_patent_valuation_methods_aicpa_110711.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB
6G-6Y73].
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2018) (making statutory damages available to per-
sons injured by use of a counterfeit mark); 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B) (2018) (de-
fining counterfeit mark for statutory damages purposes as “a counterfeit of a mark
that is registered on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office for such goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and
that is in use, whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such
mark was so registered . . .”).
147. See Rebecca Tushnet, Selling Copyright-Infringing Content Isn’t Trademark In-
fringement or False Advertising, THE 43(B)LOG (Feb. 25, 2019), http://tushnet.blog
spot.com/2019/02/selling-copyright-infringing-content.html [https://perma.cc/
T2N8-FRKY] (citing Joint Stock Co. “Channel One Russia Worldwide” v. Russian
TV Co., No. 18 Civ. 2318, 2019 WL 804506 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019))); see also Am.
Soc’y For Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, 896 F.3d 437, 455-58 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (trademark could be violated if defendant used it on a website to dis-
tribute materially inferior digital versions of tangible goods); Phx. Entm’t Partners
v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817, 822-31 (7th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases, including Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003), requiring mar-
keting of “a tangible good” under trademark theories); Lions Gate Entm’t, Inc. v.
TD Ameritrade Servs., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1255-56 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (plagiarism
of content in online video ads not actionable under trademark theory due to
Dastar).
148. See Tapestry, Inc. v. 2012coachoutlets.com, No. 17-24561-Civ-Scola, 2018
WL 704864, at *4-7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2018) (in apparent in rem action against
dozens of domain names, ordering domain name registrars for defendants’ in-
fringing domain names to transfer them into holding accounts at registrar of
36
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ample statutory damages for copyright infringement or trademark coun-
terfeiting could ensure adequate monetary compensation (and probably
overcompensation, given the probable small stakes of some of these ob-
scure-website cases).149  Under eBay, the structural resemblance of the
Lanham Act and the Patent Act on injunctions should have resulted in
trademark and anti-counterfeiting lawsuits being rigorously policed for ir-
reparable injury.150  The provisions regarding transfer or cancellation of
domain names on trademark grounds do not refer to equity, however.151
In rem seizures of domain names and other assets used in counterfeiting
also present unique remedial issues.152
In patent law, it has long been assumed that the loss of goodwill to a
patent owner already (and still) practicing its patent could be irreparable
injury.153  If goodwill is defined in connection with the loss of customer
accounts, this harm is often not truly irreparable.154  When the patent
owner loses accounts due to an infringer’s lower prices, that fits squarely
plaintiffs’ choosing); ABS-CBN Corp. v. Does, No. 2:16-cv-08031-PSG-JEM, slip op.
(C.D. Cal. July 5, 2017) (in trademark case, ordering domain name registries to
cancel or place holds on domain names on a schedule); Las Vegas Sands Corp. v.
Li, No. 2: 15-cv-02340-GMN-VCF, slip op. (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2017) (similar); cf. also
infra note 15 and supra note 101 (citing Paramount, Elsevier, UMG Recordings, etc.);
McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC v. Khan, 323 F. Supp. 3d 488, 500
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[A] number of courts have found that a transfer of domain
names is an appropriate remedy to prevent further infringement of a copyright
holder’s rights.” (emphasis added)).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2018) (statutory damages available to persons in-
jured by use of a counterfeit mark); 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B) (2018) (defining
counterfeit mark); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018) (copyright statutory damages of up
to $150,000 per work infringed by defendant, assuming willful infringement).
150. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“Similar to the Patent Act, the Lanham Act grants federal courts the
‘power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such
terms as the court may deem reasonable.’ . . . Because [of this similarity] . . . the
Supreme Court’s eBay case is applicable to the instant case.” (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1116(a) (2006))).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C) (2018).
152. See, e.g., id. § 1125(d)(2)(A); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. lucentsucks.com, 95
F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (E.D. Va. 2000) (recognizing authority to transfer, but refus-
ing to apply it); Steven Baker & Matthew Lee Fesak, Who Cares about the Counterfeit-
ers: How the Fight Against Counterfeiting Has Become an In Rem Process, 83 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 735 (2009); see also Blevins, supra note 23, at 1885 (arguing that seizure power
is being exercised in criminal IP cases when statute does not contemplate it, and
that sites should be able to restore access quickly).  There are similar issues that
arise in copyright. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
153. See Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, 80 F.3d 1553, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Tate Access Floors v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 365,
375-76 (D. Md. 2001) (citing Bio-Tech. Gen., 80 F.3d at 1566); see also i4i Ltd. P’ship
v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sara Wasserman Rajec,
Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 751-53 (2012)).
154. Cf. Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 92 N.J. 423 (1983) (“Often referred to
as ‘the most “intangible” of the intangibles,’ . . . goodwill is essentially reputation
that will probably generate future business.” (quoting D. KIESO & J. WEYGANDT,
INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 570 (3d ed. 1980))).
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within the lost profits remedy.  When the patent owner is in decline due to
a reputational blow, a combination of lower prices—compensable by dam-
ages on a “price erosion” theory—and increased advertising, quality-pro-
motion, and marketing expenditures—potentially compensable by
damages on a lost profits theory on an increased costs approach—might
restore the reputation for value in the long term.155  This makes it reduc-
tive to say that a “potential loss of market share” qualifies as irreparable
harm.156  After all, if brand name recognition goes along with rising sales
and advertising expenditures, it appears to be linked to inquiries central
to the lost profits analysis.157  Thus, it seems wrong to assume that a de-
cline in goodwill must be irreparable injury.158
Mark Lemley agrees with the courts finding loss of goodwill to be ir-
reparable, because it is difficult to quantify.  He adds that the infringer’s
sales might have been made anyway regardless of the infringement, mak-
ing damages hard to estimate.  Consumers, moreover, may be confused
without even realizing it.  Thus, he endorses the Eleventh Circuit’s rule in
Commodores Entertainment Corp. v. McClary that likelihood of confusion evi-
dence also satisfies the irreparable injury requirement, rather than the
Ninth Circuit ruling in 2013 that something else also should be shown.159
It is probably contrary to eBay to equate a mere likelihood of confusion
and the attendant lost sales and possible brand damage with irreparable
injury.160  Numerous cases have rejected efforts post-eBay to equate liabil-
155. See Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1118 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“This court has clarified that adequate damages can include lost profits due
to diverted sales, price erosion, and increased expenditures caused by infringe-
ment.” (quoting Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (collecting cases))); BLAKE INGLISH, ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: A HANDS-ON GUIDE TO LITIGATION 231, 239 (2006) (applying the theory
to trademark infringement).
156. See Canon Comput. Sys., Inc. v. Nu-Kote Int’l, 134 F.3d 1085, 1090 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Tate Access Floors, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 377; Inglish, supra note 155, at 238-
39 (corrective advertising theory of damages in trademark).
157. See Minco, 95 F.3d at 1118 (“In awarding both lost profits and a reasona-
ble royalty, the trial court used the sale of fused silica as the baseline for measuring
damages. . . .  [T]he patent holder may recover for an injury caused by” diverted
sales of commercial embodiment or other reasonably foreseeable lost sales); Ver-
inata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, 329 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1093-1107 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (plaintiff can recover any lost profits for which there is causal nexus, includ-
ing convoyed sales and certain foreign sales).
158. See i4i, 598 F.3d at 861.
159. Mark Lemley, Did eBay Irreparably Injure Trademark Law?, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1795, 1803-05 (2016) [hereinafter Lemley, Did eBay] (citing Commodores
Entm’t Corp. v. McClary, 648 F. App’x 771 (11th Cir. 2016); Herb Reed Enters.
736 F.3d at 1250)); see also Gilson LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 52, at 944-49
(making similar arguments).
160. See Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (S.D. Ohio 2007);
cf. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1102-03 (W.D. Wash.
2012) (“[L]oss of market share, customers, and access to potential customers
[qualifies as] irreparable harm.” (citing Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. C
38
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ity and irreparable injury.161  A likelihood of confusion is often established
without evidence of actual confusion or harm.  The “practical effect” of
citing anecdotal evidence of confusion or other evidence highlighting its
likelihood “is to reinsert the now-rejected presumption of irreparable
harm based solely on a strong case of trademark infringement.”162
Trademark law itself is concerned with goodwill and market share
flowing from brand equity and recognition, so to find irreparable injury
based on these factors is to presume it from the finding of liability itself.163
As an empirical matter, actual impairment of well-known marks’ good-
will—defined in some verifiable way rather than as non-infringement sim-
pliciter—is a difficult effect to find in surveys or other consumer
instruments.  Attempts to find reduced recognition or significant loss of
positive image often fail.164  This may be, however, because there was no
lost goodwill.  To say that because trademark law is about goodwill, any
infringement should be presumed enjoinable unless the defendant or
09–02280 WHA, 2012 WL 44064, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012), aff’d, 696 F.3d 872
(9th Cir. 2012))).
161. See, e.g., Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 583 F. App’x 618 (9th Cir.
2014) (denying injunctive relief where irreparable harm forecasts were specula-
tive); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (no in-
junction despite infringement where defendant licensed numerous other potential
infringers for money), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Herb Reed Enters., 736 F.3d at 1250 (likelihood of confusion not
the same as irreparable injury to reputation).
162. Herb Reed Enters., 736 F.3d at 1250.
163. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y.C., N.Y., Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 559 (2d
Cir. 2002); Case 1/81, Pfizer v. Eurim-Pharm, 1981 E.C.J. para. 8; Martin Senf-
tleben, The Trademark Tower of Babel—Dilution Concepts in International, US and EC
Trademark Law, in EUROPEAN TRADEMARK LAW: COMMUNITY TRADEMARK LAW AND
HARMONIZED NATIONAL TRADEMARK LAW 46-47, 55-56 (Tobias Jehoram, Constan-
tinus van Nispen & Tony Huydecoper eds., 2010).
164. See Barton Beebe, Roy Germano, Christopher Jon Sprigman & Joel H.
Stecke, Testing for Trademark Dilution in Court and in the Lab (forthcoming 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960082 [https://perma.cc/DK6S-EES9] (providing
empirical evidence that strong brands do not get impaired much by dilution);
Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elu-
sive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 265, 274 (2000) (noting that some strong
brands may be very difficult to dilute because their links in the brain to specific
qualities or experiences are hard to break); Part C Dilution: A Review of Recent Devel-
opments, in 10 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 574 (Hugh Hansen ed.,
2008) (Jacob Jacoby and Maureen Morrin provided “strong evidence . . . that the
strongest marks are impervious to blurring”); see also Barton Beebe, A Defense of the
New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1143, 1150 (2004) (strong trademarks like FORD not harmed much by coexist-
ing with other persons and companies with that name); Ralph Brown, Advertising
and the Public Interest: The Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1191
(1948) (impossible to measure trademark-related desire in brain); Ramsi Wood-
cock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information Age, 127 YALE L.J. 2270, 2286
(2017) (brand recognition and preferences may be irrational); Senftleben, Trade-
mark Tower, supra note 163, at 69 (questioning aspects of European dilution law as
lacking foundation).
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public will be disproportionately injured, is to say something a lot like the
Federal Circuit did in eBay before the Supreme Court decision.165
Some scholars contend that it is more difficult to assess damages in a
case of one-on-one trademark infringement such as passing off than it is in
a patent case.166  The trademark owner might have preferred that the
trademark be inviolate, rather than that it be compensated for some con-
fusion, if it was not seeking a licensing fee in the first place.167  The same,
however, might be true of NPEs who would love to dominate an industry
that they feel they invented in a university lab or center, only to see some
big company run away with the money.168  Their only option, in many
cases, is to sell their patents to an aggregator that can enforce it, just as a
songwriter or composer may sell the publishing to a monolith like Sony/
ATV.169  Other patentees do practice their patents, and, like Apple in its
battle with Samsung, might also prefer to exclude infringers rather than to
be paid by them.170  Even if these entities find it easier to generate admis-
sible damages theories than do NPEs, they may still suffer the same types
of purportedly irreparable injury as trademark owners: “ecosystem effects,”
involving sales of other or future products that may follow from the sales
that the patent owner obtains a monetary award for (such as upgrades,
replacement devices, accessories, services, etc.) and “network effects,” in-
volving the post-sale promotional effect of a lost sale (word-of-mouth ad-
165. See TIM DORNIS, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CONFLICTS: HIS-
TORICAL-COMPARATIVE, DOCTRINAL, AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 87 (2017) (citing
Oliver Mitchell, Unfair Competition, 10 HARV. L. REV. 275, 280-81 (1986)) (trade-
marks and trade secrets are simply part of goodwill); id. at 86 (citing Weinstock,
Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142, 145 (Cal. 1895); Sartor v. Schaden, 101 N.W. 511,
513 (Iowa 1904)) (goodwill under California common law of nineteenth century
was a means for equity to provide a remedy for theft of goodwill generated by
investing a common word or phrase with secondary meaning or construction by
spending money and selling good products); id. at 76 (“concept of goodwill has
governed . . . substantive trademark law” since 1800s); see also CAE, Inc. v. Clean
Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 672 (7th Cir. 2001) (Lanham Act about goodwill).
166. See Lemley, Did eBay, supra note 159, at 1803 (citing other scholars).
167. See id. at 1802-03.
168. An example is David Gelernter, whose story I briefly describe in HANNI-
BAL TRAVIS, COPYRIGHT CLASS STRUGGLE: CREATIVE ECONOMIES IN A SOCIAL MEDIA
AGE 80-81 (2018).
169. See id. at 85-86 (citing James McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll:
An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J.
189, 199-201 (2006)).
170. See Apple vs. Samsung: The Clash of the Smartphones - KWHS, KNOWLEDGE@
WHARTON HIGH SCHOOL (Aug. 13, 2012), http://kwhs.wharton.upenn.edu/2012/
08/apple-vs-samsung-the-clash-of-the-smartphones [https://perma.cc/AM68-
93DT] (relating how Apple co-founder Steve Jobs thought iPhone was being stolen
by Google and implementers of its Android operating system like Samsung, and
vowed to “go thermonuclear war” over the iPhone “theft,” which observer thought
could mean that Apple could gain monopoly on smartphones and tablets by win-
ning lawsuits).
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vertising, display of the purchase as a status symbol, raising applications
barriers to entry, etc.).171
B. Complex Irreparability
The post-eBay emphasis on goodwill/market share is pronounced.  In
i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit relied upon
“strong circumstantial evidence” that Microsoft’s infringement resulted in
a loss of “market share,” which could have reduced goodwill and name
recognition in ways that were “particularly difficult to quantify” as dam-
ages.172  It also mentioned that the plaintiff had to “change its business
strategy to survive.”173  In Apple v. Samsung, the Federal Circuit reiterated
that “[w]here two companies are in competition against one another, the
patentee suffers the harm—often irreparable—of being forced to com-
pete against products that incorporate and infringe its own patented
inventions . . . .”174
Patent law’s new focus on goodwill is also perverse in some ways.  Be-
tween competitors, it is difficult to imagine a form of patent infringement
that would be worth filing a lawsuit over, but which does not affect market
share, reputation with lost customers, or “access to potential custom-
ers.”175  Satisfying this requirement involves showing little more than that
patent infringement has occurred and a competitor is to blame.176  Per-
haps more importantly, utility patent infringement does not require a like-
lihood of confusion, passing off, or other theft of goodwill.177
The emphasis on goodwill systematically favors competitors who are
seeking injunctions in order to perpetuate or recreate a monopoly-like
position.  The Federal Circuit has considered status as a practitioner of the
patent under three of the four eBay factors.178  An NPE that simply wants
171. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 640-41, 645 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
173. Id.
174. Apple, 809 F.3d at 641 (alteration in original) (quoting Apple, Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., No.: 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 7496140, at *11 (N.D. Ca.
Aug. 27, 2014)).
175. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1151-52 (Fed. Cir.
2011); see also Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l, Inc., 998 F.2d 985, 991 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (“Moreover, the court, in concluding that the public interest favored
keeping Payless’ lower priced shoes on the market [erred] . . . .  Were that to be a
justification for patent infringement, most injunctions would be denied because
copiers universally price their products lower than innovators.”).
176. Cf. Wasserman Rajec, supra note 153, at 733, 759.
177. Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1161 (9th Cir.
2007) (noting that “the Copyright Act, unlike the Trademark Act, does not protect
a copyright holder against acts that cause consumer confusion”).
178. See i4i P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861-64 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(plaintiff’s practice of patent and products considered in support of affirming
finding of irreparable injury, no adequate remedies as law, and balance of
hardships).
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to be paid some approximation of the value added by its invention, as
measured by the cost that an infringer would incur to design around the
invention and that it is willing to pay as a settlement instead, may not pre-
sent a risk of monopoly.179  Yet it is typically denied an injunction despite
presenting less of a threat to the public interest.  Not only is this in tension
with eBay’s public-interest factor, as described below, it undermines the
other three factors as well.  An NPE may have a severe injury because, as
the Federal Trade Commission observed, a university or technology incu-
bator/“design house” may have to tear up its plan to make and license
new inventions rather than marketing or retailing older ones.180  By hav-
ing to fundamentally alter its strategy and perhaps its workforce, it may
suffer more hardship than patentees with large revenue streams and many
available damages theories.
Preferring active competitors’ motions for injunctive relief under-
mines the requirement of irreparable injury.  Practicing rightsholders are
more likely to have lost profits or higher reasonable royalties.181  NPEs
may lack evidence of sales, profits, costs, market structure, manufacturing
capability, and the like that support a compensatory damages award.182
179. Cf. Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“The economic relationship between the patented method and non-infringing
alternative methods, of necessity, would limit the hypothetical negotiation [of a
reasonable royalty].”).
180. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 229 (2003).
181. See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1285 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (lost profits frequently unavailable under Panduit); Oracle Corp. v. SAP
AG, 765 F.3d 1081, 1088-90 (9th Cir. 2014) (“cost to the seller” may provide lower
bound to reasonable royalty, as “benefit to the buyer” may influence upper
bound); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
Cir. 1978) (without proof of patentee’s profit levels and “manufacturing and mar-
keting capability to exploit the demand” for its patented product, patentee may
not recover lost profits award); Mark Glick & David Mangum, The Economics of Rea-
sonable Royalty Damages: The Limited, Proper Role of the So-Called “Analytical Method”, 49
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 27-28, n.131 (2015) (noting that “minimum [royalty] could
be quite low—at or near zero” if a formerly practicing or never-practicing entity
does not “operate” (quoting Gregory Leonard & Lauren Stiroh, A Practical Guide to
Damages, in ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, LITIGATION AND
MANAGEMENT 27, 53 (Gregory Leonard & Lauren Stiroh eds., 2005))); cf.
Microsoft, Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2015) (court
accepted argument that Google, a “ ‘sophisticated, substantial technology firm[ ]
with [a] vast array[ ] of technologically complex products,’ would obtain more
value” than “an independent entity,” and noted that unless defendant has agreed
otherwise by contract, one reasonable royalty factor is excluding competitors and
preserving its monopoly (alteration in original) (citing Georgia–Pacific Corp. v.
U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970))).
182. See Meridian Mfg., Inc. v. C&B Mfg., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 808, 848-50
(N.D. Iowa 2018); Sonos, Inc. v. D&M Holdings Inc., Civil Action No. 14-1330,
2017 WL 5633204 (D. Del. Nov. 21, 2017); Chico’s Fas, Inc. v. Clair, No. 2:13-cv-
729, 2015 WL 3496003, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 2015); Atlas IP, LLC v. Medtronic,
Inc., No. 12-cv-23309, 2014 WL 5741870, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2014); IP Innova-
tion L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (E.D. Tex. 2010). But see
Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (jury
42
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The difficulty persuading potential infringers to take a license, given no
realistic threat of an injunction, may mean that the existing licenses reflect
a royalty rate of zero, which some judges may take to mean that the rea-
sonable royalty overall is zero, other evidence not being present.183  The
lack of an established royalty may be fatal to actual damages in copyright
and trademark law, although not to statutory damages.184
Achieving more clarity about whether injury is “irreparable” may in-
volve evidence of at least four types.  First, all of the evidence that supports
the request for monetary relief in the case, if any, will tend to show
whether the harm may be repaid in damages.  If there is no plea for dam-
ages, the court could order production of sales, profitability, projected
launch date, forecasting, goodwill, valuation, and other data, and decide
whether experts might have used such evidence to estimate lost profits or
a reasonable royalty, had such relief been sought.  In copyright and trade-
mark cases, the statutory damages thresholds may need to be compared to
the quantum of remaining harm that could not be recovered as actual
damages.  Second, the comparability of established licenses and offers to
license could be examined for evidence as to whether there is no good
benchmark for minimum monetary relief in the case.  Third, the nexus
may decide whether reasonable methodology is correct); Eidos Display, LLC v. Chi
Mei Innolux Corp., No. 6: 11-CV-00201-JRG, slip op. (E.D. Tex. motion to exclude
expert opinions denied Mar. 22, 2017), https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-
courts/texas/txedce/6:2011cv00201/129808/722/0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AZ5G-8CQG] (where plaintiff’s damages expert opined on advantages of patented
technology, whether opinion failed to account for complexity of technology was
for the factfinder, so court did not exclude opinions under Ericsson or VirnetX);
MAZ Encryption Techs. LLC v. BlackBerry Corp., CA No. 13-304, 2016 WL
4490706 (D. Del. Aug. 25, 2016) (declining to exclude opinion as to licenses to
patents other than those in suit, holding that criticisms went to weight of testi-
mony, not admissibility).
183. See Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314,
1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (suggesting that jury is entitled to find reasonable royalty
rate is 0% if that was within range of what defendant suggested, or if plaintiff did
not object); Interwoven, Inc. v. Vertical Comput. Sys., No. CV 10-04645, 2014 WL
490996, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2014) (reasonable royalty of zero may result);
Sonos, 2017 WL 5633204 (excluding plaintiff’s evidence of reasonable royalty
where product contained noninfringing features, expert did not analyze how de-
mand for device is driven exclusively by infringing features, and expert did not
analyze value of specific infringing features in context of many other features de-
vice offered); J. Gregory Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Li-
censes After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1809 (2016) (observing that
patents declared to be standards-essential and encumbered with obligations to be
licensed on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms may have an incremen-
tal impact on the price of a patent portfolio that approaches zero if minor patents
are bundled with “pioneering” ones).  There could be other evidence supporting a
royalty above zero under Georgia-Pacific.  318 F. Supp. at 1120; see also Embrex, Inc.
v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
184. See, e.g., Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 317-25 (4th Cir. 2013) (where
there was no licensing agreement or royalty rate on point between the parties,
damages based on speculative rate would be improper in copyright); Sands, Taylor
& Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (similar, under
trademark).
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between the defendant’s particular infringing features and the plaintiff’s
allegedly difficult-to-measure damages should be proven.185  Finally, any
evidence that the defendant will not be able to pay an award, should it be
calculable, would tend to show that the injury is irreparable.
C. Precision About Adequacy of Legal Remedies
Under some variants of irreparable injury analysis, an injury that
would not be completely or promptly repaired via a legal remedy is irrepa-
rable.186  This is an exception that arguably threatens to swallow the rule
that irreparable injury is required, insofar as injury is frequently difficult to
estimate and, once estimated, to cure rapidly and fully.  Only perhaps in
cases of massive overcompensation due to statutory damages or irration-
ally high royalties would the plaintiff be assured of being made completely
whole.
Adequate remedies at law as a prong sometimes does not add much
to the analysis of whether injury is irreparable.187  Some opinions suggest
that a potential for future harm means that no legal remedy is adequate.
This collapses the inquiry into one relating to liability along with, at times,
mootness and temporality.188  It is particularly reductive in indirect in-
fringement cases, in which continued infringement with notice of the cop-
185. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2013); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Under recent authority, this nexus standard may be satisfied if the infringing fea-
ture is one of several that drives consumer demand, not necessarily the only one.
See Genband US LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Corp., 861 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (citing Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 644 (Fed. Cir.
2015)).
186. See North v. Peters, 138 U.S. 271, 281 (1891) (“adequate, and complete
remedy at law” should be “as complete, prompt and efficient a remedy for” illegal
act or acts); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d,
1197, 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (legal remedy inadequate if plaintiff would have to
approach court again or file new suit for additional infringing acts, and if some
consequences of infringement might escape measurement); see also Disney Enters.,
Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 866 (9th Cir. 2017) (damages based on lost
licensing fees would not be complete relief as to “goodwill, negotiating leverage,
and non-monetary terms in the Studios’ licenses” with streaming services).
187. See VidAngel, 869 F.3d at 865-66 (not devoting a separate analysis to ade-
quate remedy at law); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861-63 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (considering plaintiff’s status as practicing its patent under both factors,
as well as its need to change its business strategy, reduced market share and brand
equity, and harm to goodwill); hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d
1099, 1105-06 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (threat plaintiff will have to “shutter its operations”
is irreparable harm (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188. See Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(“With regard to the second factor, the Sixth Circuit has explained that where
there is potential for future harm from infringement, there is no adequate remedy
at law.” (citing Audi v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006))).
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yright holder’s objections or the unauthorized nature of the act is part of
the liability analysis.189
One way to make this factor meaningful would be to relate it to the
question of whether and to what extent others have agreed to license the
right at issue from the plaintiff; if they have, these licenses would provide
benchmarks that would support a reasonable royalty award under a hypo-
thetical negotiation standard.190  Another way to avoid this factor’s redun-
dancy is to distinguish cases in which the market is mature, and losses
more measurable, and the market is more incipient or unformed, in
which case losses may be nearly impossible to estimate.191  A third way is to
distinguish between infringers who cannot afford to pay a judgment and
those that can.192  A fourth is to inquire whether statutory damages are
available—as with registered trademarks that are counterfeited or cyber-
squatted upon and copyrights that are timely registered—regardless of dif-
ficulties estimating lost profits due to reduced goodwill or share or
changes in negotiating positions.193
189. See Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007);
China Cent. Tel. v. Create New Tech. (HK) Ltd., No. 15-01869, 2015 WL 3649187,
at *11-12 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2015) (holding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed
on merits because defendant continued to allow specific infringing material to be
made available on its computer system, and that injury was irreparable because
continuing infringement was threatened (citing, inter alia, Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales
Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2001), as stating: “Evidence
of threatened loss of prospective customers or goodwill certainly supports a  find-
ing of the possibility of irreparable harm.”)).
190. See Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 765 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2014) (hold-
ing that where plaintiff “has no history of granting similar licenses,” and offered no
“evidence of ‘benchmark’ licenses in the industry approximating the hypothetical
license in question here,” it had insufficient evidence of the amount of a hypothet-
ical license to support the damage award); Whitserve, LLC v. Comput. Packages,
Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 30 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (seemingly agreeing with infringer that rea-
sonable royalty must be based on comparable marketplace royalties); cf. Microsoft,
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that trial
court may “reject the past licenses as too contextually dissimilar to be useful to the
[reasonable and nondiscriminatory royalty] rate calculation”).
191. See Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939, 2017 WL 2123560,
at *11 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2017) (misappropriation of trade secrets relating to self-
driving car technology involved a technology that had yet to be included in a busi-
ness model of any kind, so that failure to preserve a competitive advantage would
result in irreparable harm); Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d
600, 621 (D. Del. 2008) (emphasizing that plaintiff’s industry was at a crucial junc-
ture), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 576 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
192. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 874 F.3d 370, 387 (4th
Cir. 2017) (“Injunctions have also sometimes been deemed appropriate based on
barriers to collectability after judgment.”); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 286
(2d Cir. 2012) (irreparable harm finding supported by low chance defendant
could afford to pay judgment (citing Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kline Cam-
era Corp., 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971))); China Cent. Television., 2015 WL
3649187, at *13 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F.
Supp. 2d 1197, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2007)).
193. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 81, at 803 n.98 (noting that copyright,
unlike patent, offers “statutory damages that can far exceed that necessary to com-
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Uncertainty in calculating damages seems to have drastically different
effects across bodies of IP law.  If a “substantial amount of speculation and
guesswork” is enough to show that damages are an inadequate remedy in
copyright cases, the question arises why the speculation involved in NPEs
obtaining a “reasonable royalty” when they have no sales, and the guess-
work of that inquiry itself, do not make that remedy inadequate in many
patent law cases.194  The answer seems to be that in some ways, the deci-
sion on remand in eBay seems to be more authoritative than the Supreme
Court decision.195
While the Supreme Court decision in eBay was even-handed and
largely historical, and therefore not inconsistent in principle with NPEs
obtaining injunctive relief because they have no lost sales or market share,
the concurrence was more economic in orientation and focused on disfa-
voring NPEs.  The idea that NPEs are different and should not obtain in-
junctive relief attracted only three votes in eBay.196  Nevertheless, it has
become the consensus view that this difference is nearly dispositive.  In
2009-2012, as the dust was settling on eBay’s implications, the percentage
of all patent cases that was made up of NPEs obtaining permanent injunc-
tions against infringement was only 0.00% to 0.17%, or between zero and
pensate plaintiffs,” but rejecting idea that injunctions should be denied to copy-
right plaintiffs on this ground, although seemingly because—as explained later—
excessive statutory damages would continue to overdeter and deliver a windfall,
and not because excessive statutory damages do not qualify as adequate remedy at
law); see also Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Public Law 98-473 (October
12, 1984), codified in pertinent part at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b)-(c); Anticybersquatting
Consumer Prot. Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-153 (July 2, 1996), codified in pertinent part
at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d), 1125(d); Lemley, Did eBay, supra note 159, at 1807
(describing standards of lost sales with actual confusion, or defendant’s profits
with willfulness, in Second, Ninth, and other circuits) (collecting cases).
194. Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 545 (4th
Cir. 2007); accord Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 866 (9th Cir.
2017) (injury in copyright is irreparable when it “cannot readily be remedied with
damages”); China Cent. Television., 2015 WL 3649187, at *12 (“Unauthorized and
uncompensated internet streaming that competes directly with the television pro-
gramming of a copyright owner and its authorized licensees causes harm that is
‘neither easily calculable, nor easily compensable.’” (quoting Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc. v. Barrydriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (C.D. Cal.
2012))); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50
(D.D.C. 2013) (“The damages Plaintiffs face are ‘neither easily calculable, nor eas-
ily compensable . . . .’” (quoting Barrydriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1147))).  For criti-
cisms of patent law’s uncertainties as to the amount of royalties, see Eli Fink, The
New Measure of Damages in Patent Cases, 29 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 822 (1947); Michael
Risch, (Un)Reasonable Royalties, 98 B.U. L. REV. 187 (2018); Roy Weinstein, Ken
Romig, & Frank Stabile, Taming Complex Intellectual Property Compensation Problems,
22 FED. CIR. B.J. 547 (2011); Bo Zeng, Lucent v. Gateway: Putting the Reasonable Back
into Reasonable Royalties, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 329 (2011).  Reasonable royalties
range from less than 1% to 33% or more of the sales price, from less than $1 to
more than $30 per unit, etc. See JOHN SKENYON, CHRISTOPHER MARCHESE, & JOHN
LAND, PATENT DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 3.40 (2012).
195. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).
196. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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about two cases per 1,000 filed.197  Other studies suggest that an NPE’s
chance of obtaining a permanent injunction ranges from 75% lower than
the chance an operating company would have, to an almost negligible
chance due to a virtual “per se” prohibition of their receiving injunc-
tions.198  According to LexMachina, in 2012-2015, there were 782 perma-
nent injunctions issued on cases filed anytime from 2005-2015, even
though more than 36,000 cases were filed, 2007-2015.199  In 2012, prelimi-
nary injunctions were obtained in 0.27% of patent cases, compared with
2.9% in 2000 and 2.47% in 2006.200  If, in 2008, the problem was that
patents were enforced like real property without having the clear bounda-
197. See Kirti Gupta & Jay Kesan, Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief
in Patent Cases, HOOVER INSTITUTION AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY IP2 WORKING PAPER
NO. 17004/RESEARCHGATE (July 10, 2015), draft at 27, https://www.researchgate
.net/publication/315447307_Studying_the_Impact_of_eBay_on_Injunctive_Relief
_in_Patent_Cases [https://perma.cc/996E-MUW6].
198. See Christopher Seaman & Ryan Holte, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An
Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit’s Application of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 147
(2017) (noting that “studies have found that after eBay, district courts ‘appear to
have adopted a de facto rule against injunctive relief’ for non-practicing  patentees
and other patent owners  ‘who do not directly compete . . . against an infringer’ in
a product market.” (quoting Christopher Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent
Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1953 (2016); Col-
leen Chien & Mark Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1, 11 (2012); Karen Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 95, 111 (2012))); id. (citing Seaman, supra, at 1983 fig. 1, 1988 fig. 3 for nearly
fourfold difference in chances to obtain an injunction, 16% to 72%); id. at 162-63
(operating companies receive permanent injunctions most of the time, about 72-
80% of time based on sample, post-eBay, while NPEs whose requests for injunction
are opposed receive one only about 7% of time (citing Chien & Lemley, supra, at 9-
10, 9 n.46; Ernest Grumbles III et al., The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v.
MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis of Permanent  Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
Nov. 2009, at 25); see also Ryan Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange
and Why: An Analysis of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677
(2015).  These authors refer to patent assertion entities rather than NPEs, the for-
mer term should probably be avoided, both because it rests upon assumptions
about an entity’s intentions or business model that may be difficult to verify in light
of prototypes or joint venture/consulting agreements being trade secrets in many
cases, and because it is a more pejorative connotation that may be unfair to indi-
vidual inventors or those making a market that benefits individual inventors. See
Seaman & Holte, supra, at 147, 163 (definition of patent assertion entities is based
on business strategy and failing to commercialize); cf. Christopher Cotropia, The
Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52 (2009)
(individual inventors may be unfairly tarnished with term “troll” based on “patent
assertion”). Compare Gupta & Kesan, supra note 197, draft at 1-2 (noting that for
empirical purposes, it may make sense to distinguish, based on U.S. PTO assign-
ment records, between operating companies and NPEs including individual inven-
tors, patent holding companies, and technology development companies, and
warning that some individual inventors may look like patent assertion entities sim-
ply by limiting their own liability).
199. Lex Machina—Patent Litigation Year in Review 2015, at 1, 25, http://
pages.lexmachina.com/rs/098-SHZ-498/images/2015%20Patent%20Litigation%
20Year%20in%20Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FWL-KTT8].
200. See Gupta & Kesan, supra note 197, at 10 fig. 4; see also Andrew Becker-
man-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent
47
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ries it has, the problem now may be that many patents are barely enforcea-
ble but it costs millions of dollars to define their boundaries anyway.201
These numbers may overstate the impact of eBay on NPEs.  One re-
gression analysis finds that they experienced a similar reduction in
chances of obtaining an injunction as operating companies, but had sim-
ply started with a lower chance.202  On the other hand, the numbers un-
derstate the impact, because NPEs could read the writing on the wall post-
eBay, and filed for injunctions up to 45% less often.203  Much of the im-
pact of the eBay concurrence, its adoption on remand, and the general
culture of eBay is probably felt before complaints or even patents are even
filed.
Are these dramatic effects justified by eBay’s holding?  The opinion of
the Court in eBay did not fully accept Justice Kennedy’s concurrence,
which dismissed the notion that NPEs could have any possible entitlement
to injunctive relief against patent infringement.204  On the other hand,
the decision of the district court on remand created a strict dichotomy
between patentees using injunctions as a “shield” for “goodwill” or “mar-
ket share,” and others using them to “extract money,” who are never enti-
Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
165, 192 (2007); Holte, supra note 198, at 679, 719.
201. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BU-
REAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46-72 (2008); CHRISTINA BOHAN-
NAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY
AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, at xvi (2011); Erin Coe, USPTO Director Wants to Oversee
a PTAB Case, LAW360 (May 3, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/791561/
exclusive-uspto-director-wants-to-oversee-a-ptab-case (noting that “average costs are
$334,000 through a PTAB hearing and $469,000 through appeal, whereas in pat-
ent litigation, average costs are significantly higher per party: $873,000 when less
than $1 million [is at issue]” and more than $873,000 in cases in which $1+ million
is at issue).
202. See Gupta & Kesan, supra note 197, draft at 38.  NPEs had a much lower
chance of winning a permanent injunction motion even in 2003-2004, obtaining
one a little more than a third as often as operating companies in 2003, or one NPE
injunction in about every 250 patent cases filed by an NPE in 2003, and a little
more than half as often as operating companies in 2004, or one NPE injunction in
about every 125 cases filed. See id. at 27.  There are two ways that this study might
have controlled for factors that disproportionately confront NPEs in ways that
eliminated an adverse effect on them that eBay did have.  First, it controlled for the
length of the case, which may be longer for failed operating companies due to
some firms’ scorched-earth approach to their patents, which drags out case pen-
dency times.  Second, it included failed startups in the definition of NPE, because
failed startups are more likely to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, which washes
out the trend that patent holding companies are less likely to obtain it. See id. at
32-35; Christopher Cotropia, Jay Kesan & David Schwartz, Heterogeneity Among Pat-
ent Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Patent Case Progression, Settlement, and Adjudica-
tion, 15 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 80, 103-11 (2018).
203. See Gupta & Kesan, supra note 197, draft at 23 (NPEs filed for permanent
injunctions 45% less often post-eBay, although pre-eBay column in table seems to
be mislabeled in draft).
204. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (warning against “categorical” or “broad” standards
granting or denying injunctions to groupings of entities).
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tled to injunctive relief.205  Thus, one of the most powerful effects of eBay
seems to be at odds with the decision of the eBay Court to reject Justice
Kennedy’s view.206
In this emerging post-eBay consensus view, only those who already
have money are entitled to use the courts to extract even more money
from competitors.  To take a phrase from the Book of Matthew, “to those
who have, more will be given, and they will have an abundance; but from
those who have nothing, even what they have will be taken away.”207  The
greater the market share of the plaintiff, the more likely an injunction may
issue; best of all for the plaintiff’s chances is being part of a duopoly, it
seems.208
Being more precise about adequate remedies at law should involve
distinguishing between causes of action that allow damages to be awarded
in a way that is untethered to the vagaries of the marketplace, therefore
guaranteeing an adequate remedy at law.  Courts could also be more so-
phisticated about whether those who only license out their rights in the
context of patents have no adequate remedy when there are no takers or
admissible royalty agreements and therefore no clear lost profits or rea-
sonable royalties.  Market maturity and structure may also shape the ade-
quacy of legal remedies by establishing a connection between past
performance and potential future scenarios.  Unformed or complex mar-
kets may experience more uncertainty (and irreparability or inadequacy of
damages) than those with mature players and established patterns.209
IV. PRECISION ABOUT PROPORTIONALITY
A. Proportionality as Notice
Annemarie Bridy conceptualizes injunctions against nonparty ISPs
and cloud providers, like forfeitures and seizures affecting third parties
and initiatives like SOPA, as notice failures.210  Christina Bohannan and
Herbert Hovenkamp argue that notice should be at or near the center of a
court’s decision about whether to issue an injunction in a patent case.
205. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).
206. See John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV.
2111, 2113-14 (2007) (observing that emerging de facto rule is in tension with
eBay’s opinion of the Court). But cf. Gupta & Kesan, supra note 197, draft at 1
(suggesting that unanimous Court considered “lack of commercial activity” and
“willingness to license” on part of plaintiff in holding plaintiff not automatically
entitled to injunction).
207. Matthew 25:29.
208. See Wasserman Rajec, supra note 153.
209. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 81, at 820 (noting that injunctions may
deserve to be withheld in favor of liability rules when “market-based benchmark
arrangements provide a reliable guide for the appropriate price”).
210. Bridy, supra note 108, at 777-81, 798-818; see also Andy Sellars, The In Rem
Forfeiture of Copyright-Infringing Domain Names, SSRN (2011), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1835604 [https://perma.cc/JH5R-7Z9B];
Not in My Backyard, supra note 107.
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The main justification for eBay, they suggest, is that NPEs do not place
alleged infringers on notice of their rights by entering the market with
embodiments of their patents.211  Clear, particularized, and prompt com-
munications as to the ownership and scope of property rights prevent
sunk costs by developers and innovators unaware of the right(s).212  Sub-
marine tactics and abstruse claims threaten to increase the social cost of
the patent system in a particular case or area, overwhelming its social
benefit.213
When implementers of patented technologies have invested vast sums
on a device or a process, only to have broad or undiscoverable patents
thrust upon them, they may be “held up” for excessive royalties.214  On the
other hand, once notice has been provided, the courts should be attuned
to concerns that patentees will be undercompensated by the difficulty of
calculating damages.215  Thus, one possible theory of the balance of hard-
ships under eBay (or at least eBay on remand and the resulting myth or
trope of eBay) could relate primarily to the unforeseeability of infringe-
ment claims by NPEs.
The drawback with a notice-based approach to eBay as a whole is that
the opinion did not use notice in its reasoning, which was based on statu-
tory text, history, and precedent rather than the economics of notice and
surprise leading to holdup.216  Even Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
was primarily concerned about overcharges on negotiated royalties due to
the injunction’s use as “leverage” and “a bargaining tool,” not notice.217
Although this has some roots in notions of equity as substantial justice
untainted by formalities, it is in conflict with Justice Kennedy’s own juris-
prudence on fair prices, which sets rather strict parameters for antitrust
lawsuits based on hard bargains or high prices.218  That jurisprudence,
211. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 201, at 78-81; see also eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of these [business method] pat-
ents may affect the calculus under the four-factor test.”).
212. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 201, at 78-81.
213. Cf. id.
214. See id. at 81.
215. See id. at 81-82.
216. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391; see also id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
217. See id. at 396; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY  216 (2003).
218. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 209-10, 225 (1993) (holding that scheme allegedly intended to punish generic
cigarette manufacturer for its low prices and to induce it to join pricing strategies
of major branded tobacco companies was not actionable unless there is proof of “a
likelihood that the predatory scheme alleged would cause a rise in prices above a
competitive level that would be sufficient to compensate for the amounts ex-
pended on the predation”); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 891 (2007) (although considered to be a per se illegal form of
price fixing for nearly a century, minimum resale price maintenance scheme is not
actionable if “it may be beneficial” under circumstances); cf. California v. S. Pac.
Co., 157 US 229, 248-49 (1895) (referring to justice over technicalities in court’s
50
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although grounded in competition law concerns, does not regard high
prices or bargaining leverage as automatically illegal or sanctionable.219
Notice is not everything, I should add.  A nonmovant may be notified
well in advance of the plaintiff’s IP or the court entertaining an overly
broad injunction, but that will not cure all defects from such an order, as
set forth below.
B. Probabilistic Hardships
The metaphor of a “balance” of hardships implies a somewhat proba-
bilistic inquiry.220  A judge might adopt an estimate of damage to each
side, discount it by its improbability of occurring or capacity for mitiga-
tion, and balance the two estimates.221  Or a decision could focus on the
hardship to the IP owner in light of its business strategy, and downplay the
effects on the defendant and its business partners as being meaningless in
equity.222  The sliding scale analysis of balance of hardships and likelihood
of success uses a threat of severe injury to permit an injunction despite
use of equity); STORY, supra note 141, at 147 (equity is about “justice and fair deal-
ing” unrestricted by “technicalities”); id. at 2 (equity is “conscience” of the judge);
id. at 60 (injunctions about “conscience”).
219. See Raphae¨l De Coninck, Excessive Prices: An Overview of the EU and Na-
tional Case Law, E-COMPETITIONS ANTITRUST CASE L. BULL. (June 21, 2018), https://
ecp.crai.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Excessive-Pricing-R.-de-Coninck-e-
Competitions-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR2F-M8W5] (arguing that “the mere
charging of monopoly prices is not unlawful under US antitrust law, which recog-
nizes high prices as an important element of the free-market system that rewards
innovation”); Michael Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the US and the
EC: Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 343 (2004) (observing
already, pre-Leegin, that U.S. law might be less hostile to excessive pricing than
European competition law).
220. See Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPS.
275 (2005), 2004 draft at 22-23, 32, http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=567883 [https://
perma.cc/WT59-3LUL] (defining patents as probabilistic if their validity and
scope is dependent on judicial enforcement, or perhaps private settlements); Ted
Sichelman, Innovation Factors for Reasonable Royalties, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 277
(2017), draft at 34-36 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c31bf9e4b02f4c
0b4203e6/t/5859a0a3414fb5294a5a89eb/1482268840230/Sichelman_Draft.pdf
[permalink unavailable] (arguing that probabilistic enforcement will be more effi-
cient than 100% enforcement, even if enforcement costs are low, because it may
prevent wasteful races to invent and patent the same things).
221. Cf. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co. v. 6.04 Acres, More or Less, Over,
Situated in Land Lot 1049, No. 16-17503, slip op. at § III.C. (11th Cir. Dec. 6,
2018) (citing Texas v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975)); Chris-
topher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 544-45 (4th Cir. 2007);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (noting, that in hearing First
Amendment challenges to laws or government actions that censor speech on a
matter of public controversy, Court was adopting words of “Chief Judge Learned
Hand, writing for the majority below, [who] interpreted the phrase [clear and
present danger] as follows: ‘In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of
the “evil,” discounted by its improbability, justifies invasion of freedom of speech
in order to avoid the danger’” (brackets added)).
222. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 866-67 (9th Cir.
2017); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862-63 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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only substantial evidence (or a serious question) as to the merits, rather
than a predominance of the evidence (or facts showing that the movant is
more likely than not right on the merits).223  The outcome of one balanc-
ing inquiry therefore feeds into another, potentially compounding
uncertainty.
One way to simplify the injunctive inquiry would be to do away with
freewheeling consideration of the costs and benefits of equitable relief in
statutory cases, in which the court is not so much generating a right as
administering one.224  A more automatic injunction might downplay the
relative hardships prong, especially hardships disfavored in IP law, such as
the sunk costs of an infringer into a business model that tends to in-
fringe.225  Such a simplification would be contrary to eBay, however.226
Existing law arguably locks courts in to a degree of cost-benefit analy-
sis under the balance of hardships factor.227  Judges will decline to protect
the plaintiff from harm if their order will impose excessive costs on the
defendant.228  The requirement of causation or a “nexus” between the de-
fendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s harm is part of the irreparable injury
analysis in patent cases.229  Some opinions, however, suggest that such a
requirement has a place in the balance of hardships in other types of cases
as well, to prevent undue hardship from befalling the infringer.230  An
223. See All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.
2011); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2010); hiQ Labs, Inc. v.
LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117-18 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Pathak v. Yahoo!
Inc., No.: 2:16-cv-02124-GMN-NJK, 2016 WL 4940311, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 13,
2016).
224. See Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doc-
trinal Train Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT LAW, Article 3 (2012),
draft at 1-2, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040896 [https://perma.cc/ZQP4-XXAQ]
(citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable
Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485 (2010)).
225. See VidAngel, 869 F.3d at 866-67; i4i, 598 F.3d at 862-63; Apple, Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1161-62 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 727 F.3d
1214 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F.
Supp. 2d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
226. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 874 F.3d 370, 388 (4th
Cir. 2017) (where plaintiff urged that hardship to infringer being ignored as of
moment, court rejected contention, holding it improper under eBay, which “di-
rected that, even in cases involving clear wrongdoing, such as ongoing patent in-
fringement, courts must ‘consider[ ] the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant’” (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 391 (2006))).
227. See infra notes 83, 114, 132-33, 194, 221 and supra notes 232-233 and
accompanying text (citing Christopher Phelps, Abend, and Grokster).
228. See Laycock, The Neglected Defense, supra note 224, draft at 35; cf. Lemley,
Did eBay, supra note 159, at 1812 (high-cost hypothetical involving ongoing ad
campaign of infringer).
229. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
230. See Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 545-55
(4th Cir. 2007) (although irreparable harm balance of hardships counseled
against selling house built with infringing plans, because that would be “punitive”
52
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equitable adjustment of the parties’ interests in the withholding or modifi-
cation of the requested relief might be especially appropriate where the
plaintiff may obtain lost profits, a benchmarked reasonable royalty, or gen-
erous statutory damages, blessing the infringer’s continued use of the IP as
a forced judicial sale.231
Complex works throw a wrench into the machinery of equity.  In
Abend v. MCA, Inc.,232 for example, the court denied an injunction against
a film that infringed a short story that had been properly cleared for the
film during its initial copyright term, but which reverted to the author for
the renewal term.233  Presumably, the initial deal could have provided
some basis on which to award damages, and the court could have avoided
questions of hardship altogether.  Faced with precedent suggesting that an
injunction should be near-automatic unless “great public injury” would re-
sult, the court focused on the hardship to the defendant resulting from
being restrained from exploiting its own copyrightable contributions to a
derivative work based on the story.234  However, it also noted that the
plaintiff could be compensated by receiving the profits attributable to the
story in the renewal term, or his actual damages in terms of licensing.235
In a variety of software and streaming cases, the courts are dispensing
with the precise analysis of Abend.  Perhaps out of a desire to be punitive,
they are not always assessing with much care whether damage models
could compensate the plaintiff, or whether parties other than the in-
fringer might lose access to information or entertaining content.236  Nor
are they analyzing in some cases whether there is a causal nexus between
in that “it would encumber a great deal of property unrelated to the infringe-
ment,” including materials of house, “the swimming pool, the fence, and other
non-infringing features, as well as the land underneath the house”); Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1220 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (noting that court crafted injunction to alleviate concerns it would “wipe
out” non-infringing features); Nerney v. New York & N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 83
F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1936); Lemley & Weiser, supra note 81, at 799.
231. See Christopher Phelps & Assocs., 492 F.3d at 545 (collecting cases).
232. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988).
233. Id. at 1479, aff’d, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
234. See id.
235. See id. at 1479-80.
236. See Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 172-75, 180-82
(2d Cir. 2018) (instructing district court to enjoin service that allowed clients of
text-searchable news and entertainment television programming archive and per-
form clips that respond to their keywords from defendant’s server, after having
noted that plaintiff might have a viable business model doing this itself, and there-
fore lost profits); Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 866 (9th Cir.
2017) (noting that plaintiffs’ loss of “goodwill, negotiating leverage, and non-mon-
etary terms in the Studios’ licenses cannot readily be remedied with damages,” but
not explaining why, and citing a case in which presence of some of these factors
were arguably present, yet no irreparable injury was found (citing Herb Reed En-
ters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250) (2017))); Lions Gate
Films Inc. v. John Does 1-10, No. 2:14-cv-06033, 2014 WL 3895240 (C.D. Cal. pre-
liminary injunction granted Aug. 8, 2014); Bridy, supra note 108, at 816-18
(describing Escape Media and Lions Gate cases).
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the harm and the act to be enjoined or whether the defendant could af-
ford to pay a royalty or lost profits award on all infringing files or streams if
found to be liable.237  Their opinions could use shoring up.  Often, there
is a manifest failure to consider hardship to the defendant and to those
providing it with dual-use, often lawful services such as domain names and
CDNs.238  In some of these cases, the service may have few or no assets; in
others, as with Google or a CDN, the assets of a nonparty included in the
order could pay for any damage to the plaintiff from ongoing infringe-
ment without any difficulty.
In trademark cases, courts have discounted hardship to the alleged
infringer when it sells fewer products or services under the mark, has low
or easily calculated costs of compliance, has multifaceted business opera-
tions of which the infringement is a small part, knew of or recklessly disre-
garded the possibility of trademark infringement, or invested a lot less in
the trademark than the plaintiff or movant.239  In trademark- and
237. See TVEyes, 883 F.3d at 180-82 (not mentioning these facts); VidAngel, at
865-66 (same); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1034, 1039
(9th Cir. 2013) (declining to decide on significance of fact that defendant linked
to infringing files that had originated on other sites, because precise damage calcu-
lations are not required for injunctions); Arista Records, LLC v. Tkach, 122 F.
Supp. 3d 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding CDN provider to be bound to preliminary
injunction against website, without mentioning availability of damages, causal
nexus to irreparable harm, or provider’s ability to pay damages, where website was
found direct and secondarily liable for copyright infringement, and had used pro-
vider to move to new domain names via provider’s domain name server and re-
verse proxy service); Capitol Records, LLC v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., No. 12-CV-
6646 (AJN), 2015 WL 1402049 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015) (containing no finding as
to irreparable injury); Lions Gate, 2014 WL 3895240 (granting default preliminary
injunction against streaming site played.to, torrent sites, and apparent cyber-locker
billionuploads.com without assessing causation of irreparable injury); Dish Net-
work LLC v. Dillion, No. 12cv157, 2012 WL 368214, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2012)
(enjoining CDN from providing “website services made in connection with the
MFN domains” without finding that infringement of plaintiff’s rights under DMCA
did anything other than cause plaintiff to lose subscriptions and some reputation).
But see Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 13-cv-
1215(TSC), 2017 WL 473822, at *25  (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017) (carefully considering
defendant’s net assets); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518
F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1219-20 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“Damages are no remedy at all if they
cannot be collected, and most courts sensibly conclude that a damage judgment
against an insolvent defendant is an inadequate remedy.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule,
103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 716 (1990))).
238. See Bridy, supra note 108, at 819-20 (arguing that this violates due process
against the service provider such as the CDN, which has neither been found to be
in active concert with the defendant prior to being named in the injunction, nor
found in active concert so as to be a contemnor); see also id. at 824 (although one
case found CDN to be in active concert, it did so without specific evidence (citing
Tkach, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 33)).
239. Amped & Collection, Inc. v. Hinton, No. 18-cv-6094, 2018 WL 5284912
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2018) (low or calculable infringer harm); Rhino Metals, Inc. v.
Kodiak Safe Co., No.: 1:16-285-EJL-REB, 2017 WL 2903339 (D. Idaho Mar. 25,
2017) (defendant not reliant on market affected by injunction); NYP Holdings v.
N.Y. Post Publ’g Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (plaintiff’s investment in
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franchise-type disputes, however, speculative harms will not support an
injunction.240
The balance of hardships may also weigh against issuing an injunction
when the parties are competitors.  A practicing entity and vigorous com-
petitor defendant will be less likely to be left without any income at all and
to confront insolvency and closure than an NPE that relies on licensing to
survive.  Absent some non-trivial chance of excluding an infringer from
the market, an NPE licensing firm or former practitioner may be unable
to pursue litigation to the point of judgment and post-judgment motions
and therefore to be made somewhat whole.  An infringer may, in addition,
be less likely to be aware of an NPE, so that infringement will not be sub-
ject to a similar likelihood of enhanced damages or attorney’s fees to com-
pensate the patentee for the uncertainties involved in pleading, proving,
and remedying all the infringements.  And, as set forth below, a competi-
tor patentee may threaten the public interest with market power.241
C. The Difference Between Hardships and Public Interests
The balance of hardships (or of equities) is “strongly associated with
the court’s power (and duty) to tailor equitable relief to the circumstances
mark); T-Mobile US, Inc. v. Aio Wireless L.L.C., 991 F. Supp. 2d 888, 929 (S.D.
Tex. 2014) (plaintiff’s greater length of use and investment); Starbucks Corp. v.
Heller, No. CV 14-1383-MMM, 2014 WL 6685662, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2014)
(comparative length of use); Halo Optical Prods. v. Liberty Sports, Inc., 6:14-cv-282
(MAD/TWD), 2014 WL 3670664 (N.D.N.Y. June 24, 2014) (no major harm to al-
leged infringer, which could go on without mark); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Upadhyaya,
926 F. Supp. 2d 614 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (alleged infringer’s risk of creating confu-
sion); Rovio Entm’t, Ltd. v. Royal Plush Toys, Inc., No. C 12-5543 SBA, 2012 WL
5936214 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012) (alleged infringer’s multifaceted business oper-
ations); Estate of Ellington ex rel. Ellington v. Harbrew Imps. Ltd., 812 F. Supp. 2d
186, 195-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (defendant could prevent harm to itself from injunc-
tion by rebranding its trademark violating product); All. Bank v. New Century
Bank, 742 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (risk or knowledge); Petro Franchise
Sys., LLC v. All Am. Props., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 781 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (calculable
infringer harm).
240. See McCall Weddings, LLC v. McCall Wedding & Event Dir., No. 1:14-cv-
315-REB, 2015 WL 3867962, at *2 (D. Idaho Jan. 9, 2015) (noting that after trade-
mark owner obtains discovery into customers lost to defendant due to infringe-
ment, it can begin to “quantify any related business losses,” and that: “What is left
is only the possibility that some harm may be missed, or otherwise not fully ac-
counted for, and that possibility is not enough to support a temporary restraining
order” (citing Winter v. Nat. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008))); Tutor
Time, slip op. at II.b.1. (no irreparable harm found on motion for preliminary
injunction to enforce non-compete agreement where it was speculative whether
plaintiff would have made a sale to defendant’s customers); see also Gilson Lalonde
& Gilson, supra note 52, at 924, 941, 956 (collecting cases); cf. People’s Club Int’l,
Inc. v. People’s Club of Nigeria Int’l-N.Y. Branch, Inc., No. 3: 18-CV-1144, 2018 WL
3581697, at *1-3 (D. Conn. July 25, 2018) (speculative harm in breach of contract
dispute).
241. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
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of the case.”242  While apparently important, it is obscure.  It is not, appar-
ently, a cost-benefit analysis, like burden < probability of loss.243  In some
contexts, it has to do with the defendant’s clean hands, or equitable pos-
ture.244  The Supreme Court has called it a balancing of the “effect on
each party” of the injunction as well as of “claims of injury.”245
A balance of equities (or of hardships) balances somewhat incom-
mensurable phenomena: the past injury to the plaintiff, the future effect
on the defendant, and the future injury to the plaintiff and effect of the
injunction on that.  The effect on the defendant is often not mentioned,
however, by the courts.  It may be unquantifiable, and it may have little to
do with injury to the plaintiff.  Moreover, that effect is often discounted if
it flows from ceasing infringement, there being no right to continue it.246
Other factors may be considered, however, including intent, the public
interest, etc.247
Some of the impetus for eBay seems to be about hardship to the in-
fringer when the patentee tries to gouge it, at least for the three justices
joining the concurrence.248  Thomas Cotter argues for a presumption in
favor of an injunction unless there is evidence of holdup or the like, indi-
cating a harm to the public.249  Douglas Laycock observes that hardship to
the nonmovant and the public may be doing the real work in many injunc-
tion decisions, because injuries that may otherwise be regarded as irrepa-
rable may be recast as having an adequate damages remedy if hardship is
feared.250  While he does not mention it, this happened in Abend, for
example.
One example of a controversy about relative hardships was The Wind
Done Gone case, or Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.251  The district
242. Samuel Bray, What Is the Balance of Equities?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(July 2, 2017), https://reason.com/volokh/2017/07/02/what-is-the-balance-of-
equitie [https://perma.cc/VL4Q-46WC].
243. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
There was an echo of this kind of analysis in one prominent post-eBay decision of
the Court. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (in vacating
preliminary injunction and indicating that a similar permanent injunction would
be unwarranted, weighing burden of injunction on defendant and availability of
less restrictive alternatives against alleged injury to interests alleged to exist by
plaintiffs).
244. See Bray, supra note 242.
245. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.
246. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 867-68 (9th Cir.
2017) (holding that “ ‘lost profits from an activity which has been shown likely to
be infringing . . . merit[ ] little equitable consideration’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1995))).
247. See Laycock, The Neglected Defense, supra note 213, at 3.
248. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
249. See THOMAS COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL & ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 105 (2013).
250. See Laycock, The Neglected Defense, supra note 224.
251. 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
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court found “potential damage” to the plaintiff in a large extent if the
defendant was allowed to publish a critical and parodic retelling of Gone
with the Wind, with the same plot and many of the same characters, but
with further events in the narrative cast by the court as a “sequel.”252  This
damage to plaintiff was of “far greater magnitude” than the defendant’s
inability to enhance its reputation for quality literature.253  The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, with one panel concluding that the
“prior restraint” of the publishers’ expression, which is a form of hard-
ship.254  A fuller opinion focused on fair use and lack of irreparable in-
jury, but included the reference to prior restraints.255
C. Edwin Baker argues that copyright remedies must give way to the
First Amendment right to publish when dissidents or semiotic rebels make
new meanings from existing works, i.e. engage in “transformative uses.”256
Other cases have protected publishers against injunctions even when
based on statutory causes of action and judicial orders, rather than the
standardless prepublication review of a censor or film board.257  These
decisions seem to be focused on maximizing the reservoir of facts and
accounts from which the public may draw in making conclusions on pub-
lic issues, rather than maintaining or intensifying the diversity of opinions
as Baker’s theory does.258
Restraining an alleged infringer’s speech on a matter of public con-
cern, at least when the speech is somewhat transformative, is both a hard-
252. Id. at 1375-77, 1380-84.
253. See id. at 1383-84.
254. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001);
see, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891,
942 (2002); Peter Johnson, Can You Quote Donald Duck?: Intellectual Property in
Cyberculture, 13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 451 (2001).
255. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
256. Baker, supra note 243, at 942.
257. See id. at 944-45 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Fla. Star
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)).
A pre-Nebraska, pre-Bartnicki concept of prior restraint is still in use by some courts,
and focuses on the lack of “narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority,” which is a concept more difficult to apply to IP remedies.
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969).  The Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, and other countries still have such boards for video
games, and China for books and films. See Nicholas Kristof, China Bans One of Its
Own Films; Cannes Festival Gave It Top Prize, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug. 4, 1993,
www.nytimes.com [https://perma.cc/UD8Z-VFN8]; Kevin Webb, China Crackdown
on Video Games Is Costing Publishing Giants Billions in Profit, BUS. INSIDER UK (Oct 25,
2018), http://uk.businessinsider.com/china-video-games-crackdown-costing-bil
lions-2018-10 [https://perma.cc/24YU-SZRU]; cf. Jeremiah Steinfeld, Game On:
Trump Has Jumped on the Ban Video Games Bandwagon.  The Hysteria Is Increasing, and
Potentially Unjustified, 47 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 106 (2018).
258. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 US 765, 783 (1978) (“[T]he
First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
which members of the public may draw.”); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st
Cir. 2011) (same).
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ship to the speaker and contrary to the public interests in speaker
autonomy and diversity of expressed opinions.  A 2015 study prepared for
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe states that legal regimes
aimed at targeting the Internet for regulation can threaten overreactions
on the part of service providers who receive notices of claimed infringe-
ment.259  Two international experts on freedom of expression as a human
right opine that no restriction should be made without an adversarial pro-
cess and a judge’s order.260  Prohibiting platforms from facilitating the
publication online of documents unless their authors or owners consent in
advance would restrict a lot of legitimate journalism and public discourse
based on leaks such as the Pentagon Papers.261  Annemarie Bridy con-
cludes that a federal campaign to seize Internet domain names in 2010-
2012 violated the First Amendment as well as due process for the third
parties whose lawful content such as websites got caught up in seizures.262
While most discourse on the property-liability distinction to date has
involved Coasean concerns about efficient bargaining, holdup, and over-
compensation,263 injury to the intangible interests of the defendant and
its business partners in publishing documents should also be considered.
A focus on this interest could introduce more precision about what pre-
cisely an injunction covers, in terms of existing pages of a website found to
infringe and the like as opposed to any content or data taken from the
plaintiff, etc.
Baker urged the courts to overcome their reticence to applying First
Amendment limits to copyright, as the Wind Done Gone court had and as
the Supreme Court had in libel and obscenity with New York Times v. Sulli-
van and Roth v. United States.264  An example of what such limits look like
came recently with the First Circuit’s decision on an injunction against
online libels, including in Facebook pages and the comments section of
259. See Institut suisse de droit compare´, Blocking, Filtering and Take-Down of
Illegal Internet Content, at iii-iv, (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.coe.int/en/web/free
dom-expression/study-filtering-blocking-and-take-down-of-illegal-content-on-the-
internet [https://perma.cc/3YC2-NPBC].
260. Michael Geist, The Case Against the Bell Coalition’s Website Blocking Plan
(Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/03/caseagainstsiteblockingfi-
nale/ [https://perma.cc/2QAJ-4WM9].
261. See Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 83-84
(2d Cir. 2014); Brave New Films v. Weiner, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2009);
Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
262. See Bridy, supra note 108, at 810-13, 832. R
263. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2101-02 (1997); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972).  In the interests of space and time, I do not discuss the econom-
ics or international law implications of eBay or Rule 65, or most of the theories that
emanate in some way from the Calabresi and Melamed article.  Nor do I discuss
many important issues of infringement, fair or nominative use, and secondary lia-
bility that may intertwine with remedies.
264. See Baker, supra note 243, at 893 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
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thewashingtonpost.com.265  The court held that the injunction must be
examined carefully and framed so as to be as narrow as needed to meet
the objective of the relief.266  Even though the six most egregious state-
ments that were enjoined (out of considerably more than that) had been
made with the requisite actual malice under Sullivan, the court held that
an “injunction that prevents in perpetuity the utterance of particular
words and phrases after a defamation trial” is overly broad and does not
use the least-restrictive means of advancing the state’s interest in remedy-
ing libels.267
Barring future statements in particular imposes a prior restraint (“a
judicial permission slip to engage in truthful speech”) and “fails the First
Amendment requirement that it be ‘tailored as precisely as possible to the
exact needs of the case.’”268  In both respects, it can be said to be contrary
to the public interest.  Courts have therefore taken some care in copyright
and trademark cases to avoid these defects in an injunction.269  As one
court stated: “While enjoining copyright violations may not itself violate
the First Amendment, the risk of overbroad injunctions and the Constitu-
tion’s clear concern for expressive freedom recommend prudence in this
area.”270
On the other hand, the public interest indicates that the rule of
thumb granting injunctions to patent plaintiffs who are competitors of the
defendant, and denying it to others, may not always promote the public
interest.  Assuming that the only relevant public interest under eBay is the
promotion of science and the useful arts, in the constitutional phrase, it
265. See Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 11-12, 15 (noting 132 allegedly
defamatory statements, damages verdict of $720,000, including libels in “myriad
web postings,” such as on Facebook and thewashingtonpost.com).
266. See id. at 29-30 (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 764-
65 (1994)).
267. See id. at 30-34.
268. Id. at 34 (quoting Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Annej, 393
U.S. 175, 184 (1968)); see also Baker v. Joseph, 938 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (S.D. Fla.
2013) (collecting cases).
269. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Comput. Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1015-
17 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that permanent injunction against trademark dilution
should not have extended to placing hyperlinks to disparaging/negative commen-
tary about plaintiff); supra notes 15, 24, 26, 101, 251, 255; see also Kuper Indus.,
LLC v. Reid, 89 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1014 (D. Neb. 2015) (declining to enjoin defen-
dant from allowing its customers to use the trademark in connection with defen-
dant’s business, even though court enjoined defendant from using the trademark,
as an unlawful prior restraint); Renaissance Learning, Inc. v. IntraData, Inc., No.
14-cv-738-jdp, 2015 WL 2185599 (W.D. Wis. May 11, 2015) (“The court will not
enjoin IntraData from all use or reference to ‘ATOS,’ as IntraData is entitled to
make fair use or non-trademark use of Renaissance’s marks for such purposes as
honest comparative advertising.”); Infogroup, Inc. v. DatabaseLLC., 95 F. Supp. 3d
1170, 1192 (D. Neb. Mar. 30, 2015) (holding that without “persuasive evidence of
actual confusion, there is also no persuasive evidence of injury to [Lanham Act
plaintiff]”).
270. SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 874 F.3d 370, 385 (4th Cir.
2017).
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still may not make sense to prioritize injunctive relief for integrated com-
petitors who develop and as well as market products.  One of the main
ways that famous authors and inventors have financed their continuing
work, or expanding the scope of their efforts, is by selling their works or
patents.271  Patents tend to be worth considerably more to these persons
as a right to exclude, as opposed to a right to seek a reasonable licensing
fee.  A reasonable royalty presents potential developers of others’ inven-
tions with a tempting question: why not take a chance by infringing and
dragging out any resulting litigation, if the worst-case scenario is simply to
pay an approximation of what the inventor would have demanded to “sell
out”?272
A conglomerate or integrated corporation is not left as desperate as a
solo inventor when the market to sell patents dries up as a result of such
calculations.273  It will be able to invest its existing profits, which may not
be based on patents so much as first-mover advantages, know-how, trade
secrets, network effects, political corruption, etc.274  In addition, the pub-
lic may be less likely to pay an overcharge relating to the patent where the
patentee does not have market power in a product market. In a competi-
tive market, a licensee would be a “price-taker” and incur the cost of any
271. See William Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corpo-
rate Inventors to Sell Patents, 58 U. MAIMI L. REV. 1045, 1123-28 (2004); Adam Gun-
derson, Protecting the Environment by Addressing Market Failure in Intellectual Property
Law: Why Compulsory Licensing of Green Technologies Might Make Sense in the United
States: A Balancing Approach, 2014 BYU L. REV. 671, 685 (specialization on new
inventions in lieu of marketing existing ones may be more efficient and good for
society); Wasserman Rajec, supra note 153 (similar).
272. See Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“nothing
to lose” by paying reasonable royalty after trial (quoting Stickle v. Heublein, 716
F.2d 1150, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Maxwell v.
J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (could be the “profitable, can’t-
lose course” to infringe and pay royalties in losing cases (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1988))).
273. See Jeffrey R. Williams, Betty Lynn Paez & Leonard Sanders, Conglomerates
Revisited, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 403 (1988) (observing that conglomerates parlay
core competencies into ever-expanding markets); cf. also Elvir Causevic and Ian
McClure, Effectively Discharging Fiduciary Duties in IP-Rich M&A Transactions, 14
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 87, 91 (2017) (tech conglomerates offer varied services, often
bought from others); Frank Pasquale, The Automated Public Sphere, in THE POLITICS
& POLICIES OF BIG DATA: BIG DATA, BIG BROTHER? (Ann Rudinow Sætnan, Ingrid
Schneider & Nicola Green eds., 2017) (tech conglomerates are growing enormous
and regulating economic possibilities of others who use the Internet).
274. See Michael Abramowicz & John Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patenta-
bility, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1633, 1666-67 (2010); Yeolan Lee, Caron St. John, Eric A.
Fong & Yongchuan Bao, Flexible New Product Development Processes and Appropriability:
Intellectual Property and First-Mover, 22 INT’L J. INNOV. MGMT. 1850002 (2018); Roger
Kerin, P. Rajan Varadarajan & Robert Peterson, First-Mover Advantage: A Synthesis,
Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions, 56 MKTG. 33 (1992); Robert Merges,
Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1992).
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license fee due to an inability to raise prices to pass the royalty along.275
In markets where injunctions are more likely to issue under eBay as some-
times construed, however, there may be substantial overcharges due to the
patentee becoming a giant operating company.
The public interest is probably more often threatened by injunctions
between competitors, than by injunctions sought by those seeking a mone-
tary payout only.  In numerous reported cases, practicing competitors’ in-
sistence on their property interests in patented improvements has served
to suppress those improvements and slow progress.276  In addition, larger
market shares possessed by operating companies increase the danger of
overcompensation that underlies some defenses of the eBay decision.277
An NPE may have less of an ability to drive a more efficient way of practic-
275. See Aqua Shield v. Inter Pool Cover Team, 774 F.3d 766, 772-73 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (citing Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
276. See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(jury and district court found that, in two-player market, patentee had monopo-
lized and attempted to monopolize the market for certain high-performance de-
vices, although Federal Circuit reversed, holding that antitrust law does not protect
competitors); FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Charges Qualcomm with Monopolizing Key
Semiconductor Device Used in Cell Phones (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semicon-
ductor-device-used [https://perma.cc/WY8G-XE3L] (Qualcomm leveraged pat-
ent-related dominance in chips into deals that foreclosed competition with it
contractually, FTC alleged in 2017); Complaint, ¶¶ 2-11, 16-56, Ward v. Apple,
Inc., No. 4:12-cv-5404 (N.D. Cal. complaint filed Oct. 19, 2012) (plaintiff alleged
that patent owner, facing limited competition with its smartphone at first, locked
the carrier down by manipulating SIM cards, harming consumers); Complaint, ¶¶
10-59, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 05-441 (D. Del. June 27,
2005) (Intel gained market power, in part by using patents, and then offered re-
bates not to deal with main competitor AMD, “foreclosing” it from a substantial
portion of the market); Cheryl Lee Johnson, CIPRO’s $400 Million Pay for Delay:
How California Law and Courts Can Make a Difference in Reverse Payment Challenges, 67
RUTGERS U.L. REV. 721, 742-49 (2015) (arguing that patent owners that manufac-
ture generic pharmaceuticals can conspire with leading generic manufacturers
and, by making a reverse payment from patentee to infringer when the patent is at
risk due to litigation, maintain a monopoly in the drug); Mark Lemley, Antitrust
Counterclaims in Patent and Copyright Infringement Cases, 3 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1
(1994) (describing monopolization issues in IP); Kurt Saunders & Linda Levine,
Better, Faster, Cheaper-Later: What Happens When Technologies Are Suppressed, 11 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 23, 29, 38-40, 52-62 (2004) (collecting cases on suppres-
sion of technology and competition by dominant firms); id. at 69 (problem hap-
pens “many” times); Jordan Robertson, Intel Settles AMD Claims But Isn’t off the Hook,
ASSOCIATED PRESS/PHYS.ORG (Nov. 12, 2009), https://phys.org/pdf177247607.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3YX-K96N] (Europe fined Intel more than $1.5 billion for
abusing dominance, while State of New York made similar allegations, Intel settled
AMD suit for $1.25 billion, and FTC was also investigating).
277. In a bilateral monopoly situation as between the patentee and the imple-
menter, the implementer may have no other viable technology to use, and suffer
an overcharge. See BMI, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1979); Intercollegiate
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 201, at 80-82.  Technically, it is not clear that
there is a bilateral monopoly situation when the rightsholder has other potential
licensees with whom to deal. See Bitler Inv. Venture II, LLC v. Marathon Petro-
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ing the patent out of the marketplace, as with AT&T and certain methods
of communicating over packet-switched networks, Microsoft and various
applications that it bundled into Windows, or Apple and Samsung’s lower
cost open-source Android devices with rounded edges and icons.278  In
Joseph Schumpeter’s phrase, when a profitable operating company elimi-
nates some or all of the competition in order to preserve its profits above a
level needed to ensure adequate production in its field, its “business strat-
egy of keeping [its abnormal profits] alive is inimical to the growth of total
output.”279  In some antitrust cases, a dominant incumbent acquired pat-
ents, sued others, and gained power in other markets.280
In the streaming media area, evidence surrounding intermediary lia-
bility in Europe and the United States indicates that imposing monitoring
and blocking obligations on intermediaries will disadvantage startups and
mature small- and medium-sized enterprises.  They may lack the capital to
maintain the “(trust and) safety units” and technical infrastructure that
will be needed.281  This suggests that some forms of third-party blocking,
filtering, and monitoring injunctions may be against the public interest as
leum Co. LP, 741 F.3d 832, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2014); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 684
F.3d at 1339.
278. See, e.g., WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS: HOW A GROUP OF HACKERS,
GENIUSES, & GEEKS CREATED THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 241 (2014) (describing how
AT&T told a developer of packet-switched network technology, Paul Baran, that it
did not want to create a competitor to its common carrier network); Matt Burns,
The Decline of Android Foretells the Rise of a Total Apple Monopoly, TECHCRUNCH (Apr.
26, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/04/26/apple-will-one-day-rule-the-
world/ [https://perma.cc/9KJV-GDV8] (describing fears that, with Samsung and
Motorola struggling to retain smartphone market share, iPhone could win a mo-
nopoly); Zack Whitaker, Apple Wins “Device Destroying” Injunction Against Motorola,
ZDNET (Mar. 2, 2012), https://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-wins-device-destroy
ing-injunction-against-motorola/ [https://perma.cc/BX3L-FA98].
279. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, & DEMOCRACY 105 (1950);
see also Wasserman Rajec, supra note 153, at 766-67.
280. See Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424 (10th Cir. 1952)
(patentee used patents as part of unlawful scheme to maintain a monopoly by
publicizing the patent, sometimes filing baseless infringement suits, acquiring
more patents, etc.); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 422-25,
431, 438-39 (2d Cir. 1945) (patentee became dominant early on with patents, and
maintained position by preempting each new opportunity); Ann Bartow, Separating
Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter and
Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J.  SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2000) (ar-
guing that when patent portfolios of big companies grow vast, they can be used as a
weapon to snuff out competition); cf. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d
683 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (competitor of defendant alleged that latter, using patents,
attempted to expand a monopoly from one technology to another).
281. See Senftleben, Breathing Space, supra note 8, at para. 52 (noting that star-
tups might have difficulty complying with monitoring obligations imposed hosting
services like Rapidshare in Germany, or on larger cloud services like Apple if—for
example—they were to offer a version of Apple’s iCloud service that scans user
hard drives to find song files and unlock streaming versions of the songs in iCloud
(citing Brian Leary, Safe Harbor Startups: Liability Rulemaking Under the DMCA, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1167-69 (2012))).
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applied to smaller platforms, even when such an order would be war-
ranted in cases involving giant platforms.282
D. The Future of Tailoring in Complex IP Cases
As other scholars have argued, injunctions could be better tailored in
the future by limiting them to specific illegal conduct, which the court has
adjudicated to infringe, and which the court has found to cause irrepara-
ble harm that damages will not remedy.  This sort of tailoring would vindi-
cate the notice and administrability concerns of Rule 65, and the statutory
interpretation ruling of eBay as to the use by Congress of the term “equity.”
Other forms of tailoring would involve, as Annemarie Bridy persua-
sively argues, careful attention to whether a third party has aided and abet-
ted or acted in concert with the main defendant(s) before addressing it
with an injunction or requiring it to enforce one.  Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that an absent corporation, alleged to be a shell with re-
spect to the defendant, should not be enjoined until the alter ego analysis
is done.283  The standard for active concert and participation is variously
styled as knowing participation or purposive joinder in the activity.284  In-
dependent action at arm’s length seems to be insufficient to find privity or
concert and bind a nonparty to an injunction.285
In copyright and trademark law, courts could tailor relief closely to
the added value brought to the defendant’s work from the infringement,
or the value destroyed by the infringement.286  This, as noted previously,
characterizes only some post-eBay decisions.  Others do not attempt to
causally link the harm to particular provisions.  This threatens to penalize
legitimate authorship or inventorship, as well as to bestow a windfall on a
few fortunate IP holders that Congress may not have intended.
There is a vital interest other than the constitutional basis of copy-
rights and patents, namely the protection of the freedoms of speech and
of the press from invasions.  As discussed in some cases, the public interest
is disserved by injunctions that impact freedoms of speech or association.
Enjoining those who act in knowing concert with infringers may overdeter
violations of IP regimes because creators and publishers whose content is
wrongly suspected or accused of infringing may be removed in error.287
282. See, e.g., Danny O’Brien & Jerry Malcolm, 70+ Internet Luminaries Ring the
Alarm on EU Copyright Filtering Proposal, THE VERGE (June 12, 2018), https://www.
eff.org/deeplinks/2018/06/internet-luminaries-ring-alarm-eu-copyright-filtering-
proposal [https://perma.cc/KB49-NV9Y].
283. See Bridy, supra note 108, at 819 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine R
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969)).
284. See id. at 820 (collecting cases).
285. See id. at 830 (collecting cases).
286. Geller, supra note 130, at 62 (suggesting that copyright remedies be tai-
lored, as in Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124 (E.D. Mich. 1979), to
permit distribution of infringing work with infringing portions redacted).
287. Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV.  901,
932-33 (2002); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
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Depending on the terms of the injunction, it may be even more costly to
comply with than a reasonable royalty award would have been to pay.
Some injunctions against Internet companies and seizures of Internet in-
termediary assets such as domain names threaten third parties’ legitimate
content.288
Assuming that a defendant is not judgment-proof, courts could also
be more willing to grant injunctions in cases of unregistered trademark
infringement, trademark infringement without actual confusion or willful-
ness/counterfeiting, or copyright infringement without a timely registra-
tion prior to infringement or shortly after publication.289  In those cases,
statutory damages will be unavailable and other monetary relief should be
examined for whether it too will far short of being adequate.290  In cases
of willful copyright infringement, the U.S. Code and international princi-
ples may endorse overcompensation of the plaintiff as a routine matter,
based on a deterrence policy.291  The same may be true of trademark
counterfeiting and cybersquatting, and some cases of willful trademark in-
fringement or dilution without counterfeiting.292  Counterfeiters also have
a lesser speech interest, misleading commercial activity not being
protected.293
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article was to emphasize the need for precision
when proposing or entering injunctive relief for infringement of intellec-
tual property rights, especially against an entire category of content such
as a website or an Internet account.  Some injunctions stray into impreci-
sion when they are focused on the type of violation found rather than the
infringing elements of the accused products or materials.  Other injunc-
tions attempt to sweep in third parties or unrelated infringement asser-
tions in ways that conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13 n.30 (2003); Ronan
Perry & Tal Zarsky, Who Should Be Liable for Online Anonymous Defamation?, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 162, 189 (2015).
288. See Lemley, et al., Don’t Break the Internet, supra note 12.
289. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of N.Y., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (“The Copyright Act is . . . identical [to Lanham Act] in much of its statutory
damages language.  Both authorize determinations within a broad range ‘as the
court considers just,’ 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1),(2); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1),(2), with
the maximum increasing for ‘willful’ infringements, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2); 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).”).
290. Blake Bertagna, Poaching Profits: An Examination of the Ability of a Trade-
mark Owner to Recovery an Infringer’s Profits under the Lanham Act as Amended in 1999,
16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 257 (2007); Lemley, Did eBay, supra note 159, at 1796
(warning of situation in which trademark owner wins case but has no remedy).
291. See Geller, supra note 130, at 64.
292. See Sara Lee, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 166-70 (noting that deterrence and willful-
ness may drive these awards, resulting in award in case at bar of three times of a
reasonable compensatory award or what it would be).
293. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-04 (1982).
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certain statutes as well.  Each of these types of court order may threaten to
rewrite statutes, impose a prior restraint on protected speech, or chill the
speech of those caught up in the crossfire.
Scholars opining on eBay’s legacy have raised doubts about whether
the requirements of equity relating to injunctive relief in federal cases are
intended seriously, or merely rationalize outcome-driven arbitrariness.294
This Article has argued that some of the worst disparities could be avoided
by applying similar concepts and definitions across case types, primarily
irreparable injury, adequate remedy, and the public interest.  More rigor-
ously analyzing the factual support for some proposed injunctive language
could achieve the aims of substantive law while harming fewer innocent
third parties.
294. Steve Tensmeyer, Constitutionalizing Equity: Consequences of Broadly Inter-
preting the Modern Rule of Injunctions Against Defamation, 43 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L.
72, 89 (2017); see also the comments on outcome-driven equity at the Supreme
Court during the discussion section of the Section on Remedies panel at the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools 2016 Annual Meeting, entitled “Equity in the
Federal Courts.”  AALS, Recordings (2018), https://memberaccess.aals.org/
eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=AALS&WebKey=75b8e4cc-2dd1-4905-be92-469210
b54826 [https://perma.cc/7672-43ZE].
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